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INTRODUCTION
Bank managers’ compensation is a topic that has become of considerable importance due to
the economic and financial crisis of 2008; in fact, possible connections between the structure
of executive remuneration and the economic depression itself could be found.
In  recent  decades  a  fervent  international  debate  has  grown  around  the  theme  of  the
multimillion-dollar remuneration paid to Chief Executive Officers of the largest multinational
companies and especially of the major banking institutions.
The events  that  have  occurred  during  the  2008-2011 period  have  profoundly marked the
current world economy and have seen the international banking sector play a leading role. The
interventions of the Central Banks to restore liquidity in the banking sector, has made it clear
to the whole world what role held the banking system in determining the fate of the entire
planet  and  have  focused  the  attention  on  the  strategic  and  operational  choices  made  by
financial managers these last years.
In  the  aftermath  of  the  financial  crisis  of  2008,  the  international  debate  was  focused on
finding those responsible for the most severe recession that the world was facing since 1929.
The argument concerned the wild remuneration attributed to executive and top managers,
which have been definitely recognized, by the G20 in 2009, as one of the underlying causes of
the crisis.
With  executive  compensation  we  generally  refer  to  the  remuneration  policy  for  top
management. Usually, executive remuneration link to firm performance in its various forms
(for example,  stock options,  equity plans or bonuses related to  firm value) has became a
commonly used tool  for  the managerial  remuneration in  all  sector, especially in  banking.
Given the growing importance of CEOs’ variable compensation, we need to understand its
impact on risk in banks (Cerasi and Oliviero, 2015).
Indeed, there is the idea that banking remuneration practices had induced the executives to
engage  excessive  risk  and imprudent  attitudes  (with  the  “risk”  term,  I  am referring  to  a
potential loss due to a negative result caused by an uncontrollable event). This risky behavior
could have led to resounding failures, like those of Bearn Sterns and Lehman Brothers, and
jeopardized the survival of a large number of other banks, who often have had to resort to
public intervention to avoid the financial collapse. Therefore, the excessive risks taken under
the impetus of distorted incentive systems have not only damaged the world economy, but
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they ended up rapidly deteriorating the economic-financial and equity conditions of the same
financial institutions that had promoted.
The period that preceded the global financial crisis has been characterized by excessive risk-
taking in the financial sector. The causes of this situation are many and complex, but, in the
financial  sector,  the  public  sector  and  in  academia  there  is  a  general  consensus  on  the
important role played by incentive structures in financial institutions.
The sub-prime financial crisis has reignited the debate on the subject of remuneration, on the
relationship between short-term incentives and goals, as well as on need for new rules for
listed companies. The issue of managerial compensation, especially for the members of the
board, executive or not, has been the subject of deep-level international reflections.
The main point was that the executives’ compensation was not properly related to long-term
performance, and this led to find a solution and discuss how to solve this problem. In fact,
incentive  structures  should  reflect  long-term  targets  closely  aligned  with  performance.
Furthermore, the whole culture of bonuses has also been questioned by those arguing that
performance-related  financial  incentives  are  not  necessary  to  induce  high-quality  work
(Marshal, 2009).
The use of bonuses was believed to be an effective compensation system that was designed to
incentivize managers to perform better  and work harder. However, bonuses seem to have
encouraged the wrong type of motivation (De Cremer, 2010). Incentives led CEO to take too
much risk and to focus on the short run (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2009). 
The truth is that a good incentive pay system needs to target the optimal trade-off between
performance and pay (Efing et al., 2014).
Usually,  CEOs’  pay  is  set  by  a  compensation  committee  and  may  be  ratified  by  the
shareholders meeting. In fact, shareholders use pay to limit the moral-hazard problem caused
by the low ownership stakes of CEO's (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2000).  Through incentives
such bonuses, options, or long-term contracts, shareholders can motivate CEO to maximize
firm wealth. 
However, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) results show that there is no evidence that banks with
a better alignment of CEOs’ interests with those of their shareholders had higher stock returns
during the crisis. In fact, there have been evidences that banks which had shareholders and
CEOs’ interests aligned, had worse return on equity and worse stock returns.
So, we cannot argue that executive compensation is responsible for this crisis, however, it has
been blamed as being an aggravating factor (Marshal, 2009). 
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Then, the purpose of my work is to give a synthetic overview of theoretical knowledge in the
field of executive pay and try to understand how bank executives, during the sub-prime crisis,
were  paid  and  which  kind  of  link  their  remuneration  could  have  had  with  the  banks’
performances.
My study will try to provide answer on what actually was the main cause of the devastating
outbreak of the 2008 financial tsunami. I will show how the problem of banks’ compensation
practices  had a  huge role  in  the matter  and I  will  explain  this  through a basic  empirical
analysis. The main message that arises from my investigation is the clear correlation between
the compensation dynamics that were widely in vogue in the banking sector in the four years
mentioned (2008-2011) and the bank financial  results  that were therefore achieved in the
same period.
In particular, I’m looking forward to examine the problem from two points of view. The first
is a profitability viewpoint of the compensation paid to the executive. The second consists of
the conditions of profitability which characterized the banking groups examined in the 2008-
2011 period. 
The thesis is organized as follows:
The first  chapter  analyzes  the problems traditionally associated with banks and addresses
issues such as Principal Agent Model, Agency Theory, Moral Hazard, managers’ risk aversion
and  risk  taking.  I  will  try  to  propose  a  review  of  the  academic  literature  on  Executive
compensation, beginning with seminal works of Jensen and Meckling (1976), passing through
Barro and Barro (1990) and Houston and James (1992) which have been one of the few
scholars that have focused their studies on CEO compensation in the banking sector, up to the
most recent literature on the financial crisis. 
After analyzing the literature and the agency problems, we need to address the issue of moral
hazard. A key component that should not be underestimated is the role that moral hazard, has
played in the evolution of financial pay in the last few years. Specially, moral hazard played a
central role in the events leading up to the crisis. 
Later, I shall undertake a brief analysis and explanation on how the crisis of sub-prime broke
out.
I'm going  to  analyze  which  are  the  incentives  for  risk-taking.  The  common  idea  among
scholars,  as  a  result  of  the  sub-prime  crisis,  is  that  banking  bonuses  and  executive
compensation arrangements created incentives for excessive risk-taking in the banking sector
and this seems to be one of the greatest causes of the meltdown of the world financial markets
(Bebchuk and Spamann,2009). Finally, I will try to give some ideas on the role of regulators
in  the  compensation  packages.  In  fact,  the  aim  of  regulators  should  not  focus  on
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compensations’ amount, but it should concentrate on the structure of the compensation with
the purpose of reducing the excessive risk taking choices made by the CEO. So, the subject of
this chapter is to clarify how the international debate on the issue of link pay-performance has
evolved.
The  second  chapter  aims  to  explain  the  techniques  and  tools  used  world-wide  for  the
remuneration of the executive, examining the advantages and weaknesses of each form. For
this purpose, I will focus on the executive compensation structure. The reward system goes
beyond the simple concept  of compensation.  In  fact,  the structure of  the reward package
should also try to incorporate the long-term strategic object that the company has set itself. 
I’m  going  to  analyze  the  two  different  key  components  of  the  executive’s remuneration
package, the fixed part and the variable one. I will analyze how the variable compensation is
splitted in short-term part and in the medium/long-term one. Then I’ll make a brief excursus
on  stock  options  history,  tax  rules  affecting  stock  options  compensation  and  managerial
benefits.
Finally,  I  will  explain  the  different  kind  of  CEOs  performance  parameters  that  affects
executives compensation.
In the third chapter I shall conduct a basic empirical work of the performance of three banks
(two European and one American) and the compensation of their executives during the crisis
of  sub-prime  for  the  period  between  2008  and  2011.  I  will  examine:  Deutsche  Bank
(Germany), Goldman Sachs (USA) and HSBC (UK). I’ll  study the different remuneration
policies of the three chosen banks. 
All this analysis has the aim to understand if the trend of banks performance during the crisis
can justify the compensation of their executives, or if the high compensation of the latter can
be justified by a good performance of the bank. We will understand if there is a positive
relation between pay and performance through the trend of the bank performance indicators,
such as Net earnings, ROE and EPS.
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CHAPTER 1
Executive compensation theory
The issue of executive compensation has always been the focus of academic debates and has
assumed a vital role in the economic literature. 
The standard economic theory of executive compensation is the principal-agent model. In this
model, shareholders act as principals while the role of the agent is taken by the executives.
Agency theory is based on the premise that principals delegate duties to an agent (the CEO),
who is expected to act in the best interest of the principal, rather than acting in self-interest.
On one hand, shareholders, for maximizing their wealth, want the firm to perform as well as
possible.  On the  other  hand,  CEO wants  to  maximize  his/her  financial  and non-financial
benefits (Yang, Dolar and Mo, 2014).
Risk-averse CEOs may have aims and goals that do not coincide with those of shareholders.
In  fact,  the  interests  of  the  shareholder-principals  and  manager-agents  are  not  perfectly
aligned (Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002). So, the board of directors comes in the game, for
finding the right balance between optimal compensations and incentives, that allows the CEO
to operate in shareholders’ best interest. 
As in any agency relationship, there is the risk that the agent will expend too little effort on
the principal’s behalf  and  that executives might make decisions that maximize their own
utility  but  that  fail  to  maximize  shareholder  value  (Bebchuk,  Fried  and  Walker,  2002).
Therefore,  CEO incentive  contracts  are  used  to  solve  the  agency problem and  allay  the
conflict of interest between executives and shareholders.
The principal-agent model assumes that the agents are risk averse, that their interests may
differ  from those of  the  principal.  For  instance,  a  CEO may move the  company into  an
aggressive diversification program of mergers and acquisitions, with modest or perhaps even
negative returns to stockholders, increasing firm size and salary and reducing business risks.
Thus, the principal may incur some losses, referred to as “agency costs”. According to agency
theory, mechanisms that align the interests of managers with those of shareholders  increase
the value of a firm (David, Kochhar and Levitas, 1998). 
Shareholders face at least three problems in reducing agency costs. First, owners can’t easily
structure and closely supervise the activities of top executives. Second, executives know more
about  organizational  processes  and  the  appropriateness  of  business  decisions  than
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stockholders.  Third,  executives are in a position to use organizational resources to pursue
objectives that may not be compatible with the best interests of stockholders. The challenge
from an agency perspective is how to induce self-centered, utility-maximizing, risk-averse
agents1, to act on behalf of the principals who want to increase the value and the performance
of the firm.
The  theoretical  work  on  the  agency  contract  indicates  that  when  agent  efforts  are  not
observable by the principal and information asymmetries are high, the principal has to transfer
risk to the agent by basing the contract on observed performance outcomes.  Agency theorists
refer to this alternative as the “second best” solution to the issue of control in principal-agent
relations. 
1.1 Review of the literature
In the past decades, economists tried to understand if CEO worked to maximize shareholders’
wealth. Executive compensation, in fact, has come under an intense academic scrutiny. Some
scholars believe that CEO’s pay are excessive, while others don’t agree with this view.
I would like to make a quick excursion into the “history” of economic literature on this issue.
Beginning with seminal works by Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976),
researchers  have addressed the agency costs  incurred by the separation of ownership and
control (Hubbard and Palia, 1995). 
One of the most important empirically studies on CEO compensation is the one of Jensen and
Murphy (1990).  They use a least  squares  regression to  calculate  the relation between the
dollar change in salary and bonus and in the shareholder wealth for all companies with at least
seven years of pay-change data from 1975 to 1988. By doing this, they found that there is a
significant positive relationship between firm performance and CEO pay. Jensen and Murphy
(1990) found an average increase in CEO compensation of $3.25 for every $1,000 increase in
shareholder wealth and  the elasticity of CEO salary and bonus with respect to firm market
value is  only 0.1.  By this,  the authors concluded that  the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm
performance was quite low. Since Jensen and Murphy’s 1990 work remains the seminal pay–
performance  sensitivity  study,  it  commonly  serves  as  a  benchmark  against  which  other
findings are compared. However, depending on the variables included, the sample used and
the time frame studied, the levels of pay–performance sensitivity observed appear to vary
widely. For example, using a new 15-year panel data set of CEOs in large U.S. firms from
1 Managers who want to pursue their own interests while minimizing the possibility of personal losses.
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1980 to 1994, Hall and Liebman (1998) concluded that CEO pay–performance sensitivity was
about four times higher than Jensen and Murphy’s s theory2.
Most scholars focused their studies on CEO compensation in industrial firms and only few of
them have  focused  on  remuneration  in  the  banking  sector.  Barro  and  Barro  (1990)  and
Houston and James (1992) are exception.
Barro and Barro (1990) use the Jensen and Murphy (1990) methodology to confirm a positive
relation between pay and performance using a sample of commercial banks. They find that
bank CEOs’ pay-performance sensitivity diminishes with CEOs experience (Brewer, Hunter
and Jackson, 2003).
Houston and James (1995) compare banks with nonbanking firms, and find no evidence of
greater compensation-performance sensitivity in banks than in nonbanking firms. They show
that  while  bank  CEOs  receive  a  smaller  percentage  of  their  total  pay from equity-based
rewards than CEOs in other industries, compensation policies in banking are more sensitive to
firm  performance  (Bliss  and  Rosen,  2001).  They  also  find  little  evidence  that  bank
compensation is designed to encourage risk-taking. As bank risk increases, the proportion of
equity-based CEO compensation also increases (Brewer, Hunter & Jackson, 2004).
Also  the  studies  of  Saunders,  Strock,  and  Travlos  (1990)  find  some  evidence  that  the
ownership  structure  of  a  bank  holding  company affects  certain  aspects  of  its  risk-taking
behavior. In particular, they discover that larger ownership positions by executive managers
and the board of directors are associated with increased risk-taking (Harjoto and Mullineaux,
2003). Saunders et al. (1990) find a positive and statistically significant relation between risk
and the percentage of stock held by the CEO. In particular, they find a positive relationship
between  insider  holdings  and  firm-specific  risk.  However,  Mullins  (1992)  argues  that
Saunders et al. findings are largely attributable to their failure to adequately control for bank
size.
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Smith and Watts (1992) papers highlight a new problem of the
relationship between bank risk-taking and compensation policies. Indeed, they argue that the
firm's asset mix and investment opportunities influence the firm's ownership structure and
compensation policies.
In  particular,  Smith  and  Watts  (1992)  hint  that  compensation  policies  are  structured  to
minimize agency costs, which are in turn determined by the firm’s asset mix and investment
policies. They also suggest that is more difficult, for shareholders and boards of directors, to
monitor managers’ actions. 
2 This sensitivity was increasing because of the increased use of stock options.
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Gorton and Rosen (1995) have focused their studies on risk and ownership structure in large
bank holding companies. They assume that as insider ownership increases, risk first increases
and then decreases. 
Years later, Cornett et al. (2010) explained that equity ownership of executives can help align
managers’ interests with those of shareholders. If managers have larger equity stakes, they
will behave more like principals and less like agents (De Haan and Vlahu, 2012).
Murphy’s (1999) idea is that the interest of risk-averse executives should be put in relation
with those of shareholders through an optimal compensation plan. Through a base salary, an
annual bonus tied to accounting performance, stock options, and long-term incentive plans,
shareholders will reward executives for their overinvestment of human capital in a single firm
and their undiversified personal wealth portfolios (Acrey, McCumber and Nguye, 2011).
Bryan,  Hwang,  and Lilien  (2000)  suggest  that  restricted  stock fails  to  induce  risk-averse
CEOs to accept riskier projects that should increase value, while later Douglas (2006) shows
that value-maximizing compensation contracts induce bank managers to pursue riskier profits
from opaque investments with high levels of information asymmetry3(Acrey, McCumber and
Nguye, 2011).
Crawford, Ezzell and Miles (1995) and Hubbard and Palia (1995) analyzed the effect that the
banking industry’s deregulation had on CEO compensation. Both find a more sensitive pay
for performance relationship after deregulation. Both papers note that the observed increase in
pay for performance sensitivity is consistent with theoretical research on the principal-agent
relationship (Bliss and Rosen, 2001). 
Hubbard and Palia (1995) tried to focus on the connection between interstate banking laws
and  executive  compensation.  They  find  evidence  of  a  stronger  pay  for  performance
relationship in states where interstate banking is permitted. So, they attribute this results to a
more active corporate control market in states that permit interstate banking. Practically, they
find stronger pay-performance relationships in deregulated interstate banking markets because
investment opportunities are greater (Brewer, Hunter and Jackson, 2003).
The latest literature dwells on the financial crisis caused by the sub-prime. 
A number of researchers have tried to demonstrate the relationship between the structure of
executive pay and the performance of banks during the Global Financial Crisis. 
3 During a financial crisis, the opacity and complexity of assets become a liability when a 
firm need to raise capital. 
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In 2006 Chen, Steiner and Whyte have demonstrated the impact that deregulation had on the
US banking sector. Using a sample of 68 commercial banks, they showed that between 1992
and 2000, these institutions had grown compensation based on stock options, which in turn
had encouraged taking risks. 
Starting from a similar sample of banks, Mehran and Rosenberg (2007) observed that the
increase in stock options in the remuneration packages was associated with a greater volatility
of the equity and asset and had led to replace debt with a greater amount of risk capital. Thus,
the ex-post budget resulting from the use of stock options seems to have been negative from
the point of view of the increase of equity risk. Although in 1997 Schleifer and Vishny had
praised the ability of stock options and stock grants to motivate managers to adopt behaviors
in line with the interests of shareholders. In fact, these instruments seem to have resolved just
apparently the agency problem.
For Kirkpatrick (2009) there is no association between remuneration of executives in financial
institutions and risk-taking. 
Also  Fahlenbrach  and  Stulz  (2011)  investigate  whether  the  degree  of  CEO-shareholder
alignment before the crisis can explain bank performance during the Crisis and they find no
evidence that banks with CEO whose incentives were less aligned with the interests of their
shareholders performed worse during the crisis.  They conclude that high levels of insider
ownership did not lead the banks to take excessive risk. Bank CEOs suffered large losses
during the crisis, indicating that while executives maintained well-aligned equity ownership
stakes they may have misunderstood the risk occurring within the banking system (Acrey,
McCumber and Nguye, 2011). 
Of the opposite view, instead, were DeYoung, Peng and Yan (2010) that in a sample of US
commercial banks examined between 1994 and 2006 found a strong empirical evidence to
support the argument that bank CEOs have responded positively to contractual incentives for
hiring more risk. 
Bebchuk and Spamann (2009) maintain that the principal–agent conflict between bank owners
and  managers  and  the  compensation  structures  have  strongly  affected  managers’  risk
preferences.  They speculate  that  shareholders approved without  any problem CEO’s bank
projects and that they were aware of what CEO were doing, much to pay them with large
sums.  If  this  thought  is  correct,  managerial  interests  were  properly aligned with  the  risk
appetites of their common shareholders (Acrey, McCumber and Nguye, 2011).
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Conventional wisdom holds that executive compensation takes only two basic forms: cash
and equity. However, a nascent literature shows that firm managers hold significant amounts
of inside debt in the form of pensions and deferred compensation. So, as the proportion of
CEO wealth held in the form of inside debt increases relative to CEO equity holdings, risk
taking declines (Tung and Wang, 2011).
1.2 Moral hazard problem
A key component that should not be underestimated is the role that moral hazard, associated
with the banking sector, has played in the evolution of financial pay in the last few years (Bell
and Van Reenen, 2010). Specially, moral hazard played a central role in the events leading up
to  the  crisis  and  to  understand  how the  economy works  is  necessary understanding  this
problem  (Dowd, 2009).
In economics,  moral  hazard  is  a  situation  in  which  there  are  two parties:  one  party gets
involved in a risky event knowing that it is protected against the risk and the other party will
incur the cost (Thoma, 2013). Moral hazard occurs under asymmetric information, when the
action taken by the agent is not observable to the principal. The agent is responsible for the
interests  of the principal, but has an incentive to put its own interests first (Thanassoulis,
2011). The agent’s action is hidden and this means that he knows what kind of action he has
taken but the principal can not directly observe those acts (Caillaud and Hermalin, 2000). The
decision is based not on what is considered right, but on what provides the highest level of
benefit. So, the action of the agent affects the well being of the principal. 
Paul  Krugman  described  moral  hazard  as  "any situation  in  which  one  person makes  the
decision about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the cost if things go badly.4"
Some possible financial examples are: the agent could pay her/him-self excessive bonuses out
of the funds that he/she is managing on the principal behalf; a subject might sell a financial
product to another part although knowing that it is not in his/her interests to buy it; the agent
could take risks that then the principal have to take (Dowd, 2009). Those examples are an
inevitable factor in the financial system and it should be up to the institutions being able to
moderate these behaviors.
4  http://www.policonomics.com/moral-hazard/
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Holmström (1979) suggested that  investing resources  for monitoring bankers’ actions and
using these information (obtained from the monitoring process) to formulate contracts, could
have been a possible solution to the moral hazard problem. But, unfortunately, this proposal
could  never  be  successful.  In  fact,  generally,  full  observation  of  actions  is  impossible  or
excessively costly.  Whenever people are protected from the downside of their choices, they
will tend to take on additional risk (Thoma, 2013). But if it’s the person itself to pay the
consequences of his/her own actions, certainly will place greater emphasis on its choices and
will act more responsibly. If the behavior of taking on extra risk could have the power to
impose costs and risks on other people, or even worse, produce a financial system breakdown,
then some mechanism is needed to temper the risk-taking and protect individuals in good faith
from the consequences of morally hazardous behavior (Thoma, 2013). 
1.2.1 Subprime financial crisis
The case in point is precisely the one of the subprime scandal. 
Originally, a  bank  would  grant  a  mortgage  with  a  view to  holding it  to  maturity. If  the
mortgage holder defaulted, then the bank would make a loss (Dowd, 2009).
From this perspective, the bank has an incentive to pay attention to whom grant the mortgage.
However, if a bank decides to securitize a mortgage, it will not make a big selection on who
could access  the loan and who does not.  In  fact,  if  the bank sells  to  another  subject  the
mortgage, it will be concentrated mainly on the payments that it gets for originating the loan
and will have no interest in whether the mortgage defaults or not (Dowd, 2009). So, by doing
this, the banks grant loans to any individual, regardless of the minimum requirements needed
to obtain the mortgage and not worrying about the risks.
Mortgage securitization enables mortgage originators to pass on the risk that the mortgages
they originate might default and not hold the mortgages on their balance sheets and assume
the risk. In one kind of mortgage securitization default risk is retained by the securitizing
agency5 that buys the mortgages from originators.
But let's analyze more critically this point.
It is important to analyze how banks operated in that period, to understand the mechanisms of
the financial crisis that started from sub-prime mortgages.
5 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
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A person who wanted to buy a house without any financial resources, obtained a mortgage
loan from the bank. The mortgage lasted on average 30 years and was at fixed rates. The bank
earned on the interest rate and fees related to disbursement of the loan, so it was essential that
the borrower was able over the years to return the installments plus the interest (Lupoi, 2012).
The technical tool is called  securitization which is the process that transforms the loans in
financial products (debt securities) traded on the market. This happens by moving pools of
loans off-balance sheet by selling them to a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which in turn
finances the purchase of the portfolio of loans by selling securities in the capital  markets
(Gorton and Metrick, 2012).
The bank gives  to  a  special  purpose  vehicle  a  mass  of  mortgages.  The SPV issues  debt
securities,  called  mortgages  backed-securities  (MBS),  which  more  or  less  replicate  the
performance of the underlying mortgages, and using the money raised from the placement of
such securities, pays at the bank the purchase of mortgages.
In this way the bank does not have to account on its balance sheet those credits and can grant
new loans to customers. In fact, traditionally, financial intermediaries originated loans that
they  held on their  balance sheets until  maturity, but with securitization the loans can be
financed off-balance sheet (Gorton and Metrick, 2012).
The increase in demand for MBS, led banks to lower the quality of the debtors, starting to
provide mortgages to sub-prime borrowers.
Securitizing MBS on sub-prime mortgages proved to be a lucrative business, in fact, these
titles  still  enjoyed a  triple  A rating  and offered  higher  interest  rates  than  previous  MBS.
Different interest rate was precisely due to the sub-prime quality of the original debtor, which
it paid for the money lent, higher committees and interest rates (Lupoi, 2012).
MBS are based on loan pool and are collected by the bank that originated them and by the
SPV, with the investment banks assistance. The pool can hold mortgages of different types
(for interest rate, time period, client characteristics). The investment bank calculates, for the
entire pool of loans, the related cash flows and then it divides the MBS in various parts, called
tranches. Pooling and tranching correspond to different types of risk. Pooling minimizes the
potential adverse selection problem which can take place during the selection of the assets to
be sold to the SPV. Instead, tranching divides the risk of loss due to default based on seniority.
Since tranching is based on seniority, the risk of loss due to default of the underlying assets is
stratified (Gorton and Souleles, 2007).
The first tranche is the safest of the lot, while the last is the risky one, as it will receive for last
financial flows. Because statistically there is always some mortgage of the pool that will not
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be paid, the latest tranches offer higher returns than the first tranches, to make them attractive
to the market. For all those reasons, the 2008 financial crisis was a bank-run crisis that occur
in a “securized banking system”(Gorton and Metrick, 2012)6. 
Summing  up,  in  the  years  before  the  crisis  (2006-2007),  about  80%  of  the  sub-prime
mortgages were financed via securitization, that is the process by which a mortgage was sold
in  as  part  of  a  residential  mortgage-backed  security  (RMBS),  which  involves  pooling
thousands of mortgages together, selling the pool to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) which
finances  their  purchase  by  issuing  tranches  of  investment-grade  securities  in  the  capital
markets (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). 
The market demand for high-risk MBS seemed insatiable, and to satisfy it the mortgage banks
delivered continuously, investment banks securized them, the ratings agencies evaluated them
as solid titles and thus were sold. Unfortunately, this giant Ponzi scheme worked until real
estate prices collapsed. Once interest rates started to rise and house prices started to fall, then
the whole edifice began to fall in on itself (Dowd, 2009).
From this analysis we can understand how the problem of moral hazard has raised. On one
hand lenders make risky lending decisions under the assumption that they would be able to
avoid holding the debt through its entire maturity. On the other one, banks underwrote loans
with the expectation that another party would bear the risk of default, creating a moral hazard.
Implicit  government  guarantees  on  bad  loans  also  created  a  moral  hazard  for  financial
institutions. Government-sponsored agencies (GSA) such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
implicitly  supported  lenders  underwriting  real  estate  loans  and  those  actions  and  claim
influenced lenders to make risky decisions.
But the real moral hazard problem that has been one of the cause of the sub-prime financial
crisis  was that  the financial  institutions  believed that  the regulating authorities  would not
allow  them to  fail  due  to  the  systemic  risk7 that  would  have  spread  around  the  global
economy. In fact, there was this general presumption that in case of seriously bad situation
those institutions would have received special treatment and protection from the authorities.
In fact, there was the widespread idea that the banks were “too big too fail” because they were
considered too vital to the economy.
6 Usually, a traditional banking run (a traditional banking system is characterized by making and holding loans)
is driven by the with drawl of deposits, while a securitized-banking run (a securitized banking system is the
business of packaging and reselling loans ) is driven by the with drawl of repurchase agreements.
7 Systematic risk: the risk that affects the overall market. This kind of risk is really difficult to
avoid. It can be mitigated by hedging and through diversification.
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Bankers effectively have government insurance against losses if the authority is forced to bail
out "too big to fail" banks to avoid catastrophic consequences for the entire economy. This
gives them the incentive to take more risks and that increases the chance of a financial crisis
(Thoma, 2013). 
As Thoma (2013) wrote, the only way to avoid moral hazard in financial markets is to make
sure that those who are making the decisions about how to invest other people’s money face
and pay the consequences of their bad actions. If the government simply bails out “too big to
fail” banks, the agents won’t face large consequences for their actions and they will have no
incentive to moderate their risky behavior.
1.3 Incentives for risk taking    
The  common  idea  among  scholars  is  that  banking  bonuses  and  executive  compensation
arrangements created incentives for excessive risk-taking in the banking sector and this seems
to be one of the greatest causes of the meltdown of the world financial markets (Bebchuk and
Spamann, 2009).
CEO risk-taking incentives depend crucially on the firm’s decision to compensate him or her
with equity-based awards. The literature on equity-based compensation suggests that such pay
is dependent on several factors such as: risk, growth opportunities, leverage, marginal tax rate,
firm size and regulation.  The amount  of risk facing a bank should impact  the risk-taking
incentives provided to the CEO. From one side, greater risk may cause a decrease in the pay-
performance sensitivity. From the other side, less risk-averse executives may self-select into
high-risk firms. If this is true, higher risk firms may provide greater risk-taking incentives.
The evidence suggests that managerial  risk-taking incentives are  an empirically important
determinant of corporate risk management behavior (Cooper, Gulen and Rau,  2009)8. 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) explain that even if incentive, such options9, have been blamed
for  leading  to  excessive  risk-taking  before  the  crisis,  there  is  no  evidence  that  greater
sensitivity of CEO pay to stock volatility led to worse stock returns. Furthermore, their results
indicate  that  bank  CEOs did  not  reduce  their  stock  holdings  in  anticipation  of  the  crisis
8
 Perhaps, provide bank managers with more equity-based compensation may be a way to encourage risk taking
in banking.  Usually executives  are risk-averse  towards  their  own companies’ stock-price performance.  But,
managers who hold a part of the bank's properties will have a different attitude at risk than those who does not
and that receives only a salary as a form of compensation.
9
 Options are derivative contracts that give the right, but not the obligation, to buy a share of 
stock at a pre-specified “exercise” price, or strike price,  for a pre-specified term.
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(obviously, if CEOs would have taken excessive risks, we would expect them to have sold
shares before the crisis. But this didn’t happen and therefore, CEOs made large losses).
If managers receive a significant part of their compensation in performance-based schemes
with short-term targets, they will have a greater tendency to choose riskier investments and to
increase bank’s leverage, since this will increase share prices (De Haan and Vlahu, 2012). The
reduction of debt reduces the risk of the shareholders and leads to a decrease in the rate of
return required from them. Leverage does not affect the risk or the expected return of the
assets of a business but raises the risk of shares. Shareholders therefore require proportionally
a higher yield due to the financial risk. Therefore, to the extent that the ROI is higher than the
cost of the debt, increase leverage allows for an increase of the shareholder yield. Typically,
the ROI increases in a less than proportional increase in investment, while the cost of debt
increases disproportionately with increasing leverage. It is therefore to find a balance in terms
of the financial structure that maximizes the return on shareholders (Borsaitaliana.it).
Through  this  view, Mehran  (1992)  documents  a  positive  relationship  between  the  firm’s
leverage and the executives’ compensation in incentive schemes. 
Bank managers may be encouraged to take risk if that risk increases the value of their equity-
based compensation (Houston and James, 1995). 
Economists like Peng and Röell (2008) and Bebchuck and Spaman (2010) demonstrate that
stock-based  compensation  causes  executives  to  focus  on  the  short-term  stock  price
developments. 
In contrast to this, however, we can say that performance-based compensation linked to long-
term stock performance  may help  to  dampen  the  problem of  the  agency costs  by better
aligning managers and shareholder interests (De Haanand and Vlahu, 2012). 
On one hand, options create an incentive to take risk because managers share in the gains but
not all of the losses. On the other hand, because options contain a leveraged position in the
bank’s equity, they also have the potential to magnify a risk-averse manager's exposure to the
bank’s risk  and  thus  reduce  the  manager's  appetite  for  risk  taking  (Gormley,  Matsa  and
Milbourn, 2013).
Incentive compensation can create incentives for risk-taking when bonuses are paid out on the
basis of inappropriate performance measures. For example, Washington Mutual excelled at
providing loans  and home mortgages  to  individuals  with risky credit  profiles.  In  fact,  its
brokers were rewarded for writing loans with little or no verification of the borrowers’ assets
or income (Conyon, Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos and Murphy, 2011).
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The basic incentive problem at Washington Mutual and others banks was a culture and reward
system that paid people to write loans rather than to write “good loans” (Bebchuk, 2009).
The reality is that most incentive plans do exactly the opposite of what their designers intend.
They are the cause of insecure behavior of managers. In fact, when the options are out of the
money and CEO are paid through them, they will have a higher incentive to take higher risk. 
Therefore,  we should  create  a  system of  incentives  that  is  able  to  merge  the interests  of
shareholders with those of managers, in such a way as to create an environment in which
managers work always in the best way and at maximum.
From an agency perspective, a CEO, whose compensation is strongly linked to his bank's
performance,  has the incentive to  take less  risk compared to  that  accepted by diversified
shareholders. On the one hand, risk-neutral shareholders would like the CEO to undertake all
positive Net Present Value projects, while, on the other hand, risk-averse CEO are likely to
avoid some risky but positive NPV projects (Grant, Parbonetti and Markarian, 2009). This
means that often the Net Positive Value projects can be risky and not always the desired risk
levels of CEOs and shareholders coincide. Therefore, sometimes, the wishes of both parties
are not realized because of this different risk aversion.
Shareholders will have incentives to engage in negative Net Present Value projects only if
those project will increase their options value. This happens because shareholders keep all the
gains  if  the  investments  are  winners,  and  they  share  the  losses  with  creditors  if  the
investments are losers (Brewer III, Hunter and Jackson III, 2003).
According  to  Tanaka  and  Thanassoulis (2015)  we  may  encounter  three  types  of  agency
problems which might lead to remuneration contracts that incentivise excessive risk-taking.
First, the agency problem between  shareholders and bank executives, in which executives
could not appropriately take the shareholders’ long-term interests into account. This problem
can be solved through deferred equity-linked pay, that is by making sure that part of the bonus
is paid in equity that vests10 at some pre-specified future date. 
Second, the agency problem between executives and debt holders, where executives rewarded
in equity-linked bonuses may have incentives to take excessive risks at the expense of debt
holders. This issue can be solved if banks regularly issue debt and so constantly return to the
judgment of the debt market. 
10
 Become exercisable. 
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Third, the  agency problem between executives and taxpayers  that springs when there is an
implicit possibility of government bailouts. Here, higher risk-taking does not lead to a higher
cost of debt funding and so risk-taking is effectively subsidized. 
From a society’s point of view, remuneration policies designed to correct the agency problem
between executives and shareholders and debt holder, may still  incentivise excessive risk-
taking.
An idea for reducing the excessive risk-taking caused by implicit and explicit guarantees on
bank debt and deposits, could be to expose the executives to the possibility of a financial loss
through bonus malus and clawback (Tanaka and Thanassoulis, 2015). 
Clawbacks are defined as the ex post adjustments to already paid bonuses, since the company
is “clawing back” rewards that had already been paid. Clawbacks are financial instruments
under which bankers are asked to pay back their bonuses if certain circumstances materialise
at a future date. In the United States, clawbacks were introduced in the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and significantly expanded in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act (Conyon, Fernandes, Ferreira,
Matos and Murphy, 2011).
Malus adjusts variable pay that has not yet vested, while clawback adjusts variable pay that
has  already  vested.  Should  be  emphasized  the  fact  that  malus  and  clawbacks  efficiency
depends  on  how  bankers  expect them  to  be  carry  out.  A  well-designed  remuneration
regulation should lead the executives to believe that they will be penalised proportionately for
losses that occurred because of their poor risk management, but not for losses that occurred in
spite of good risk management (Tanaka and Thanassoulis, 2015). 
But malus and clawbacks could work imperfectly on incentives when bankers, even if their
risk behavior has been correct, assume that these bonuses can be used in the case their bank
suffers losses. On one hand, if bankers believe to have only small losses in the event of bad
outcomes, then they end up being insufficiently risk averse. But, if the executives expect to
suffer large losses when their bank performs poorly, then they end up being excessively risk
averse (Tanaka and Thanassoulis, 2015). 
1.4 The role of regulators
The aim of regulators should not focus on compensations’ amount, but it should concentrate
on the structure of the compensation with the purpose of reducing the excessive risk taking
choices made by the CEO. In this way, regulators will address bank executives to work for,
not against, the goals of banking regulation (Bebchuk, 2010).
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Without any doubt, a good executive compensation structure, will bring managers to pursue
shareholders’ interests. Shareholders, by making managers’ compensation depend on bank’s
performance, can offer incentives for the management through a direct way, by exercising
voting rights,  or through an indirect  one,  by the board of directors (De Haan and Vlahu,
2012). 
It is more than logical to think that until executives receive rewards for upside risk, but are not
penalized for downside risk, they will continue to take greater risks. The pay-performance
classic example of asymmetries11in stock options is the one that provide rewards for stock-
price  appreciation  above  the  exercise  price,  but  no  penalties12for  stock-price  depreciation
below the exercise price (Conyon et all,  2011). Executives will  have strong incentives to
gamble with shareholders’ money when their options are close to maturity that are out of the
money, while executives with options that are well in the money have lower incentives to act
like this13. 
For these reasons it is necessary a good bank regulation, so that it might have a significant
impact on CEO pay-performance. The regulation of bankers’ pay, and so of bankers’ risk,
could also reinforce the regulation of banks’ activities, by reducing the risk-taking behavior of
banks which affects the whole economic environment (Bebchuk, 2010).
Banking  theory  shows  that  bank  regulations  influence  owners’  risk-taking  incentives
differently  from  those  of  managers,  while  corporate  governance  theory  suggests  that
ownership structure and shareholder protection laws affect the ability of owners to influence
risk (Laeven and Levined, 2008).
Shareholders  with larger  voting and cash-flow rights have accordingly greater  power and
incentives to influence and affect corporate behavior with respect to smaller owners. From
this point of view, ownership structure influences the ability of owners to change bank risk.
Laeven and Levined (2008) find that banks with more powerful owners tend to take greater
risks,  but  the  relation  between  ownership  and  risk  is  weak  in  economies  with  stronger
shareholder  protection  laws.  In  fact,  we  can  point  out  that  equity  holders  have  stronger
incentives  to  increase  risk  than  non-shareholding  managers  and  debt  holders.  Also  large
owners with substantial cash flows have the power to induce bank’s managers to increase risk
11
 Also known as “convexities”
12
 Below zero
13
 Gambling 
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taking,  but an effective legal protection for small  shareholders reduces the need for large
owners to mitigate agency problems.  
Contrary to this perspective, opponents of regulating executive pay in banks could argue that:
pay regulation will drive talent away, and because of this, financial firms will lose valuable
employees; regulators may abuse their increased power (Bebchuk, 2009).
So, in brief, compensation structures for financial executives should be redesigned in order to
avoid  excessive  incentives  for  risky  decisions.  Furthermore,  is  necessary  that  regulators
undertake to ensure that such changes take place.
In summary, scholars believe that there is a positive relationship between bankers’ bonuses
and risk-taking and so controls on bonuses will also control risk-taking. 
Bankers were cited as the main villains of the great recession, but on balance, executives’ pay
is not the only cause of excessive risk-taking, and without any doubt, a good regulation could
have helped to mitigate some of the risk-taking behavior generated by the creation of ‘too big
to fail’ policies (Matthews and Matthews, 2013).  From this point of view, in fact, bankers’
bonuses can be seen as an effect and not a cause of excessive risk taking by banks. 
CHAPTER 2
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Executive remuneration structure
The reward system goes beyond the simple concept of compensation. In fact, the structure of
the reward package should also try to incorporate the long-term strategic objective that the
company has set itself.  
Further, the definition of the remuneration schemes can not fail to consider the level of risk
assumed by each employee. The riskiness of their duties, should be adequately reflected in the
agreed reward,  especially through the variable component of salary paid (Core, Guay and
Larcker, 2003).
2.1 Remuneration packages vs risk
It should be emphasized that the composition of the remuneration packages can influence the
types of executives that the company can attract. For example, on the one hand the package
with a  higher  retirement  benefits  will  attract  executives  willing  and mentally prepared to
remain in that firm for a long time, on the other hand a package with higher bonus opportunity
will catch executives who are less risk-averse and so more likely to create value (Jensen and
Murphy, 2004).
As I have already mentioned, if shareholders are neutral-risk and diversified, while executives
are  risk-averse,  they  will  prefer,  instead  of  a  risky  package,  a  fixed  base  salary  one
(considering  the  same expected  value).  Executives  will  demand higher  expected  pay, for
covering the risk that they bear; in this way the firm will face a trade-off between attracting, at
the lowest cost, the right quality executives and having better-motivated employees working
hard  toward  the  right  outcomes.  For  these  reasons,  companies  that  introduce  risks  on
executives’ pay  packages  must  be  sure  that  the  associated  incentive  benefits  exceed  the
increased expected cost of the package (Jensen and Murphy, 2004).
All company activities, because of their uncertain outcomes, involve risk. Instead of entirely
eliminate risk, each firm must decide how much risk it is willing to assume given its risk
tolerance. 
Once  established,  the  board  devises  a  compensation  program  that  provides  incentive  to
management to pursue the company’s objectives according to this risks’ view. In this way,
compensation not only encourages performance but influences the way in which financial
results are achieved (Larcker, et al., 2014).
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Furthermore, designing an effective equity-based compensation plan (a plan that motivates
long-term value) is not a simple task (Hall, 2003). Moreover, most stock options are worth
considerably less to the executives than to the shareholders of the firms that grant them.
Brian J. Hall (2003), found that to design a good compensation packages, that correctly align
managerial incentives with the pursuit of shareholder value, is necessary to:
1. Matching time horizons.  A well-designed incentive plans motivate long run value
creation. Stock prices reflect expectation about the future. But precisely because of
that, managers might be tented to fool the market by temporarily affect their stock
prices and then cash out their equity holdings. That’s why, options are often criticized
for encouraging executives to manage short-term earnings instead of managing for
long-run  value  creation.  This  problem could  be  solved  by using  a  slow  “vesting
period”  (the  period  of  time  over  which  the  options/stock  become  owned  by
executive).14 In this way we will increase CEOs time horizon.
2. Gaming. If stock market is efficiently informed, then options and stockholdings will
lead managers to make good long-run decisions. This could be a good parameter for
judging the  outcome of  executive  decisions.  But  what  if  the  stock  market  can  be
tricked? Then paying in stock or options it would not be a sensible idea because larger
option and stock packages incentivize CEO’s to spend time trying to push up the stock
price. More generally, the temptation to game the system increases with the potential
rewards associated with gaming. Managing the gaming problem requires boards and
companies to devote resource for reinforcing corporate systems.
3. Value-cost  “wedge”.  An  important  problem is  the  potentially  significant  disparity
between the real cost of an equity and the value of the grant to the executive. For the
firm, the market represents  the economic cost of the equity. Executives,  generally,
value equity-based pay at less than its market value because they are risk averse and
tend to hold personal asset portfolios that are undiversified. Usually, the executives’
equity pay value is generally lower than the cost to the company’s shareholders15. And
the value  to  cost  ratio  depends on the  degree of  diversification in  the executive’s
holdings, the risk aversion of the executives, the volatility of the stock and the vesting
period of the equity.
14
 There has never been a clear mathematical proof that awarding slowly-vesting options, typically with exercise 
prices equal to the current stock price at the time the options are awarded, does induce the proper amount of risk-
taking by executives.
15
 In general, when the current stock price is far below the option exercise price, then options 
have little motivating power. 
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Generally, the executives’ remuneration package is split up in two key components: a fixed
salary and variable one. The fixed monetary compensation is agreed by the contract in which
are often added some benefits, such as those non-monetary forms that can be perceived by
managers in the form of insurance, services and goods for the person. Fixed remuneration, or
basic  pay, is  determined to remunerate  the work associated with a  specific  position.  It  is
composed of  a  minimum contract,  seniority allowances,  and any contingencies.  From the
individual's  point  of  view is  the  secure  part  of  the remuneration  and as  such it  provides
financial security (Balachandran, Kogut and Harnal, 2010).
The variable remuneration may be linked to various aspects, such as the evaluation of the
results related to specific predetermined objectives and the overall ex post evaluation of the
behavior. It is that part of the remuneration which, established on the basis of rules of the
game known a priori, is paid to the achievement of agreed targets. Its meaning is associated
with  incentives.  The incentive is  defined as  a  stimulus  that  serves  to  direct  and enhance
people's behavior. So a system of variable remuneration,  to constitute incentive system, it
must meet the prerequisites as trading and sharing objectives, which are essential to ensure the
commitment of individuals in relation to the objectives. Setting up a system of incentives with
objectives that the worker can not influence, creates frustration and still does not generate
commitment. 
However, not all variable pay systems are incentive. In particular, a system is all the more
able to provide incentive the closer  it  gets  to  the work of the individual.  The correlation
between individual pay and corporate performance does not necessarily reflect a degree of
influence  of  the  executives  on  the  banks’  performance.  Nevertheless,  many  companies
discover in retrospect that their incentive systems are not effective, inadequate to the intended
purposes, or do not achieve the desired objectives.
Finally, within the compensation package benefits are also included. As regards the benefits,
they allow the individual to obtain not monetary remuneration, but they respond for instance
to requirements of the combination of working and private life, or of saving on some costs. 
But let me analyze the different forms of compensation in a more specific and analytical way.
2.2 Fixed remuneration
The  fixed  component  is  the  basis  of  the  remuneration  package,  even  if  is  not  the  most
important item in terms of money, especially for managers, who get most of their  wealth
through the system of incentives (Balachandran, Kogut and Harnal, 2010).
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It has to be seen as the minimum value that the reference organization attaches to a particular
subject, in line with the professional skills required for the role and the professional spent.
Fixed remuneration is a form of compensation that is paid in cash and guaranteed despite the
type of performance (Balachandran, Kogut and Harnal, 2010). However, we use, for high-
level executive payment contracts, the term "remuneration" rather than salary to indicate that
a total compensation package can consist of more than just wages.
The determination of the fixed remuneration is the result of a market and objective evaluation
and a subjective assessment by the internal organs of the company (such as, the Remuneration
Committee).
Therefore, the fixed remuneration is determined on the basis of: 
 the economic situation and on the relevant labor market; 
 the specific individual's value, considering his professionalism, his skills and expertise;
(but it’s also influenced by its contractual power which in turn depends on the nature of
the type of work, the skills required by the firm and the conditions of market).
 the value attributed to the organizational position, the role and tasks, which reflect the
characteristics in terms of size and complexity of the entity;  
Despite the importance of the fixed salary, it is known that the key part of the rewards is
occupied by the variable compensation. Indeed, already in 1986, among a random sample of
American  firms,  Gomez-  Mejia,  Tosi,  and  Hinkin  (1987)  found  that  firms  tend  to  pay
managers more on the basis of bonuses and long-term income rather than salary to achieve
better and more efficient results.
2.3 Variable remuneration
The variable remuneration includes all remuneration elements that go beyond the basic salary.
In most cases, it is decomposed on the basis of the time-horizon. There are short-term variable
compensation and long-term. The formers are called "bonuses" and are bestowed based on the
achievement of specific annual or interim results (Young, 2009). They concern the so-called
awards that  the company decided to give their  employers  ex post,  in  view of  the results
achieved, and usually of budget availability; the latter are linked to the realization of long-
term goals. The long-term incentive schemes involve the provision of incentives related to the
medium-term  performance.  Examples  of  long-term  incentives  are:  stock  options,  shares,
company shares, phantom stocks. In particular, the Financial Stability Board has prompted
legal-regulatory and supervisory authorities to strengthen the long-term incentive based, since
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the  short-term incentives  were  considered  the  main  responsible  for  the  management  risk
taking behaviors (FSB, 2009). 
The object  of offering variable  remuneration is  twofold.  First,  companies  can lower their
initial costs for hiring employees. Second, employees often work harder to achieve pay goals,
which benefits both the firm and the employee. The real purpose of this remuneration package
is to create competitive pay.
This fact has not often taken into account, since it was the perverse incentive mechanisms that
has encouraged the hiring hazardous risks. 
The variable remuneration is often divided into basic time horizon in which it is bestowed, but
this is not the only form of classification.  In fact,  one can distinguish at  least three other
classification methods, based on (Sigler, 2011):
 The recipients of variable instruments, which can be individuals (as top managers, for
which  the  compensation  package  is  heavily  customized),  professionals’ groups  or
segments, or all kind of staff (broad based schemes).
 The type of benefits. Usually we identify at least three forms of payment of variable
benefits: the monetary form (sums of cash una tantum), equity (share-ownership plans,
stock option plans, share-based profit sharing) and bond (based profit sharing, when
the employee becomes vested16 with a right embedded in the bond assigned credit).
 The source of initiatives:  the variable fraction can be added on the proposal of the
management,  the  trade  unions  in  collective  bargaining,  the  national  and/or
supranational legal framework.
2.3.1 Short-term variable compensation
The variable  short-term incentives,  also  known as  annual  bonuses,  have  the  fundamental
function of rewarding individual performance that gave birth to a performance improvement
at the end of the administrative year. Instead, incentives in the long run are paid to the results
obtained from a certain line of business.
16
 When a stock option can be exercised, then the option is said to be vested.
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Several studies have examined the influence of short-term bonus plans17 on CEOs’ motivation
to manipulate earnings and in taking discretionary decisions. The results of these studies are
mixed due in part  to the limitations of using aggregated financial data from a large cross
section of firms that have varying forms of incentive compensation (Guidry, Leone and Rock,
1998). Some economists support the idea that managers’ incentives influence their accounting
choices. Others report evidence that managers make income-decreasing discretionary accruals
after they reach their maximum bonus level. Instead, others scholars find no evidence that
managers  make  income-decreasing  discretionary  accruals  when  earnings  are  below  the
minimum necessary to earn a bonus. So there are various opinions on this subject that do not
seem to agree (Guidry, Leone and Rock, 1998).
It  was found that  in the period before the outbreak of  the financial  crisis,  the short-term
incentive systems were primarily used with a distribution and internal equity purposes. In fact,
monetary prizes were often recognized to the vast majority of employees to promote “social
peace” (Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann, 2010).
After the financial crisis, it was realized the need to adopt a budget for programming and
containing the expenses for performance bonuses. So, national and international regulatory
authorities supported the possibility of completely revising the logic underlying the incentive
systems.
2.3.2 Medium and long-term variable compensation
The orientation of the legislative bodies  (such as the Financial  Stability Board and Basel
Committee)  was  to  promote  the  adoption  of  long-term compensation  forms  to  limit  the
damage caused by the maximization of financial results instigated by the forms of short-term
incentive. The result was that the implementation of rewarding remuneration structures in the
long-term has  spread especially  for  workers  in  the  risk  position  and for  those  with  high
managerial responsibilities such as top management and executive.
In fact, we can consider a wide range of factors that triggered the review of unprofitable long-
term  plans  such  as:  changes  in  international  accounting  standards  in  Europe,  financial
innovation on derivatives, reform of corporate governance codes, more shareholder activism
and sensational  financial  failures,  like those of Leman Brothers,  Meryll  Linch and others
(Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann, 2010).
17
 Bonus plan is use for creating incentives to improve business; the main idea is that if managers understands that
bonus are related to a determinate event (ie. Performance), then he/she will try to do his/her best to achieve that
outcome determining the success of the event. 
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Given the greater effectiveness of these plans of aligning the management experience with the
interests of the stakeholders, it has gone from closed plans to rolling plans. 
A rolling plan is one in which every year takes place an assignment that gives life to a sub-
plan that flows from year to year. A N-period program is worked out after which it is replaced
by a new N-period program, and the procedure repeats. The rolling annual plans provide for a
new assignment every year. The liquidation of the award is foreseen at the end of each year of
vesting (Kaganovich, 1994 ). Instead, a closed plan is a program that starts in a given year and
then takes a certain period of time (formerly three years) to be accomplished before a follow
up plan can begin. 
The  logic  behind  the  closed  plan  is  the  following:  it  processes  the  three-year  plan,  it
communicates to the market,  it  is pursued on time and at  the end of three years the firm
experiences the results and delivers the bonus. Instead, the rolling plan divided over several
years the allocation and supply of the potential award, creating a discrepancy between the
business plan and the incentive system horizon (Kaganovich, 1994).
In  practice,  the  bonus  award  does  not  happen  one  shot  at  the  end  of  three  years,  but
periodically, for example at the end of each year.
Assuming the firm start a plan at the end of each fiscal year, it shall make payment for the
plans of previous years, creating a certain discrepancy between multi-year business plans and
disbursed incentives. In fact, with this tool, it would diminish the link between the market and
the variable remuneration as would be reduced by far the issue of stocks’ volatility.
Traditionally  the  short-term bonuses  were  disbursed  in  liquid  form,  while  the  long-term
awards were distributed through equity instruments. To induce management to make more far-
sighted choices, it was decided to distribute equity type instruments, leaving the market to
indirectly judge the work of raising or depressing the value of share prices.
However, the distinction between annual cash bonus and stock allocation plans of actions
and /or  stock  options  on more  dilated horizons is  no longer  the practice observed in  the
American and European markets today. Remuneration policies have resulted in compensation
systems far more sophisticated.  The award mechanisms in the medium and long-term are
usually classified into three major categories.
The first is represented by equity-based traditional instruments, or based on the allocation of
shares. In turn, these instruments are divided into:
 Stock options: are derivative contracts that give the right, but not the obligation,  to
buy a share of stock at  a pre-specified “exercise” price,  or strike price,  for a pre-
specified term. The option is exercised when the strike price is below the market price
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of the security (Abowd and Kaplan, 1999); Furthermore, stock options give executives
the right to purchase a certain number of shares at a predetermined price within a
given time period.  This  price,  usually, represents  the market  value at  the time the
stocks  are  granted.18 Stock  options  have  been  criticized   for  having  encouraged
executives  to  manipulate  short-term earnings  and  stock  prices.  After  options  vest,
executives  have  an  incentive  to  push  up  the  firms’  share  price19.  However,  this
incentive can be altered by forcing executives to retain most of their shares obtained
through options for several years or until they retire (Pozen, 2014).
 Performance stock options: are company stock given to managers only when certain
targets are achieved. They are very similar to stock options, with the difference that
are characterized by a double guarantee: the strike price, as profitable price for the
purchase, and other performance indicators.
 Performance shares: assign a bonus in shares to managers who have contributed to
important  results  in  the  medium-long term.  In fact,  they are  shares  guaranteed by
virtue of achieving precise results. The term “performance share” is a generic term
referring to a share that has limited rights unless and until a nominated performance
milestone is achieved (ASX Linstin Rules, 2014). 
 Restricted shares: Restricted stock operate in much the same manner as stock option
plans.  They are  another  form of  stock ownership  of  a  company which  allows the
interests of the executive and shareholder to converge. Restricted stock refers to stock
of a company that is not fully transferable until  certain conditions have been met.
When  this  condition  are  satisfied,  the  stock  is  no  longer  restricted,  and  becomes
transferable to the person holding the award. With restricted stock, an executive will
be assigned ordinary shares subject to restrictions on the sale. These restrictions shall
expire in a period of years, provided that the executive remain with the firm (Westphal
and Zajac, 1994). 
Typically, restricted stock awards endow executives with a fixed quantity of shares
that have restrictions on resale or transfer (Bryan, Hwang and Lilien,  2000).  They
prevent the holder of such shares from exercising the related sale and trading rights on
18
 If stock price declines, the executive still receives substantial economic gain from the share grant. By contrast, 
firms’ shareholders, due too the stock price fall, have lost economic value. To achieve better alignment of 
shareholder and executive interests, companies should grant restricted shares that vest only if certain 
performance conditions are met (Pozen, 2014).
19
 So they can exercise their options and immediately sell their shares. 
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the market before the end of  the vesting period20.  When the vesting period ends, the
restricted shares “belong” to the executive that is free to cash them out (Fried and
Bebchuk, 2010). Typically, this period is at least three years. In one respect, restricted
stock is similar to a stock option, since it can be viewed as an option with a zero strike
price. They also supply a tax deduction and provide CEOs with the privileges of stock
ownership,  including  dividends  and  voting  rights  (Bryan  et  al.,  2000).  Restricted
stocks have limitations on the shares. One of the most common restrictions requires a
period of time to pass or for a certain goal to be achieved before the executive can sell
the stock (Sigler, 2011).
The  second  category  are  the equity-linked  cash-settled  instruments, which  provide  for
payment in monetary terms of the amount of conditioning scale the performance of the stock
market. More specifically:
 Phantom options:  is a compensation plan that confers the right to receive cash at a
future point in time. The amount of cash is linked to the value of the company’s stock
or the appreciation in the value of the stock after the date of the phantom stock award
(King, 2013). So, they give the right to receive, at the end of the fixed period, a prize,
in shares and /or cash, calculated on the basis of the increase in value recorded by the
shares  between  the  start  and  the  end  of  the  period,  increased  by  any  dividend
distribution. Thus, the amount of the payout will increase as the stock price rises, and
decrease  if  the  stock  falls,  but  without  the  recipient  actually  receiving  any stock.
Phantom stock is like a cash bonus deferred until the future, but typically much bigger
than an annual bonus (King, 2013). 
 Performance unit: is a simulation of a performance share plan, where, however, the
actions  are  only  virtual.  They  tie  financial  rewards  to  long-term,  individual
achievements,  yet  they  don't  entail  prolonged  financial  obligations  the  way many
phantom-stock do (Fraser, 1991). If the executive achieves his or her performance unit
goals over a defined period, each unit will increase in value to the point where it can
be redeemed for its new value, in effect as a cash reward (Fraser, 1991).
The tools belonging to the first two categories have overlapping technical aspects, although
administrative aspects, different contributions and corporate governance.
20
 The "Retention period obliged" in the portfolio.
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Finally, the third category includes non-equity instruments based or cash. Non-Equity based
incentive compensation is typically derived from a predetermined agreement that specifies the
payment  of  a  bonus  conditional  on  the  achievement  of  goals  typically  measured  using
accounting number such as earnings, or revenues. They are divided into:
 Long-term money plans or cash: is a bonus plan that extend the performance over
years  (usually,  it’s  paid  over  three  years)  and  is  based  on  the  achievement  of
predefined  performance  targets  (Balachandran,  Kogut  and  Harnal,  2010).  It  is  a
methodology in vogue especially in unlisted companies.
 Deferred bonus: one of the most important innovations in vogue since the financial
crisis in the remuneration package of the executive. In fact, many public companies
and  investment  managers  have  increased  the  portion  of  the  cash  bonuses  that  is
deferred for several years (Pozen, 2014). The bonus is often assigned in shares and
once spent a minimum period of time (at least three years) during which you can take
better account of a greater number of risks that depress financial results. What I mean
is that all or a part of bonuses are deferred for longer than one year. This delayed part
of bonuses is correlated to future performance. So, an executive will receive a bonus if
the level of company performance is reached and maintained for an extended period of
time. So deferred bonus can extend the time horizon of the compensation plan and it
may  also  influence  executive  behavior  by  reducing  the  probability  to  manipulate
bonuses.21
To sum up,  firms  by adopting  Long-Term compensation  have  the  intention  to  align  the
interests of top management with those of the firm's owners. In fact, stock options, bonuses
and  performance  shares  should  improve  the  relationship  between  compensation  and  the
financial performance of the company (Westphal and Zajac, 1994). However, poorly designed
equity-based plans  can  yield  excessive  levels  of  compensation  and  provide  incentives  to
destroy rather than create (Jensen and Murphy, 2004)
21
 Furthermore, in most cases, deferrals of cash bonuses are combined with provisions that allow firms to “claw 
back” a deferred bonus if certain adverse events occur. In fact, firms may usually claw back a deferred bonus if 
the relevant executive is later found to have engaged in illegal or unethical activities. Thus, bonus deferrals and 
associated claw backs are an effective way to encourage a longer perspective than one year. (Pozen, 2014).
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      Table  2:  Summary  of  the  various  types  of  medium-long  term  variables
compensations.
Equity-based
traditional
instruments.
Stock options Derivative contracts  that  give the right,  but
not the obligation, to buy a share of stock, at
a strike price, for a pre-specified term. 
Performance stock options Stock given to  managers  only if  they meet
certain performance targets 
Performance shares Shares  that  have  limited  rights  unless  and
until  a  nominated  performance milestone  is
achieved
Restricted shares Restricted stock that is not fully transferable
until certain conditions have been met. When
this conditions are satisfied,  the stock is  no
longer restricted, and becomes transferable to
the person holding the award.
Equity  linked  cash-
settled instruments
Phantom options Compensation plan that confers the right to
receive cash at a future point in time
Performance unit Simulation  of  a  performance  share  plan,
where the actions are only virtual. 
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Non-equity
instruments  based or
cash
Long-term  money  plans  or
cash
Bonus plan that extend the performance over
three years and is based on the achievement
of predefined performance targets.
Deferred bonus Often assigned in shares 
Source: Own elaboration data form: Pozen, 2014, Balachandran, Kogut and Harnal, 2010 and King, 2013.
2.3.3 A Brief on Stock Options
Stock options are incentive contracts that are granted to senior management and members of
the board. These plans assigned to the employee the right to  obtain, in case of using shares
issued previously, or to subscribe, in case of using newly issued shares, securities representing
the company's risk capital.
Studies provides several possible reasons behind a firm’s decision, as a part of executives’
compensation, to adopt stock options. 
First of all,  stock options have a non-negative asymmetric payoff that produces monetary
gains  only after  the  share  price  exceeds  the  exercise  price.  This  convex  payoff  function
provides  an  incentive  to  managers  to  become  less  risk-averse  (Tzioumis,  2011).  Let  me
explain in a clearer way this point. The intrinsic value of stock options is a nonlinear function
of share price. The value moves with stock price when the option is “in the money” (when
stock price is above exercise price). However, the value is unaffected by stock price when the
option is “out of the money” (when the stock price is below the exercise price). This means
that when stock price rises above the exercise price the executive has unlimited potential
upside. While, when stock price falls below the exercise price, the executive is protected on
the downside. This fact, encourages risk taking. Stock options link the value of executive
wealth to changes in stock price volatility.  Studies shows that executives understand that the
expected value of a stock option increases with the volatility of the stock price. So, executives
tend to respond to stock option awards by investing in riskier projects. Second, stock options
operate as an attraction for specific types of managers. In addition, these latter, would have an
incentive to stay in the firm and hold their stock options instead of lose them by leaving the
firm (Tzioumis, 2011).
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If we consider a simple stock valuation model, for example the Gordon Model22, we can draw
the following discussion. Stocks’ value is proportional to the expected dividend to the next
period, and is inversely proportional to the difference between the risk-adjusted cost of capital
and the rate of future dividend’s growth. Some scholars argue that managers’ incentives can
lead the latter to manipulate  the market perception of the level of earnings of the firm by
altering the earning report (Kandle, 2009). Since the previous year's performance is used as an
indication of future earnings’ growth rates, CEO, desiring an increase in the current stock
price, is encouraged to show high growth for as long as possible, at the expenses of the long-
term performance23. Manager can hide a drop in growth rates, by hazarding into risky projects
with negative NPV. As long as the outside market does not fully observe the riskiness of these
investment, stocks’ price stays high, and in this way manager is compensated accordingly
(Kandle, 2009).24
However, the incentives provided by stock options have also been criticized. Those against
stock  options  believe  that  the  gains  from stock  options  have  been  overrated  (Kedia  and
Mozumdar, 2002). Stock option plans are complex financial instruments. The difficulty is to
identify and understand how the incentive should work. In fact, it is possible that once the
options are exercised and CEOs come into possession of the shares, they may adopt a line of
conduct  designed  to  protect  only the  gain,  no  longer  developing  an  entrepreneurial  risk-
oriented behavior.
The determination of the exercise price is not a little problem: setting a too low price in a
rising market is likely to facilitate the exercise of the option; on the contrary, an excessively
high strike price in excess phases can demotivate managers. Companies, acknowledged the
impossibility of being able to predict and affect the performance of financial markets, have
developed tools to overcome these forward difficulties. First,  by considering the premium
price of stock options that follow a steady increase of the exercise price during the life of the
plan, based on an assumption of bull market. Secondly, they bring the attention of the indexed
stock options, which accommodate both bullish and bearish market hypothesis proceeding
22
 Gordon Model: method for estimating the intrinsic value of a stock based on the discounting 
of dividends.
23
 Obviously, CEOs compensated with current earnings are not affected by this consideration. While, managers 
compensated through stock price want to exhibit growth, as their compensation today crucially depends on the 
market perception of future earnings. 
24
 This behavior is caused by the need to maintain the appearance of growth in the eyes of the investors, which is
driven by the desire to maximize the current stock price. 
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with a regular update of the price attached to some stock market indices. It seems clear that in
this case you can not reap the biggest gains resulting from unexpected positive equity market
trend (Romano and Bhagat, 2009).
2.4 Managerial benefits
Benefits  are  a  component  of  the  compensation  package  that  is  acquiring  an  increasingly
important value, not only because sometimes preferred by employees in lieu of the traditional
short and long-term bonuses and equity instruments, but also because they often allow a more
effective recognition of performance. Benefits allow the individual to obtain a remuneration
"in nature", ie not monetary, while allow the organizations to give good or service at a price
lower than the real value; this is the case of the so-called flexible benefits (such as agreements
with wellness centers, gyms, kindergartens) where for companies do not necessarily involve
an outlay, but for individuals involving actual savings. But often the benefits are awarded on a
hierarchical basis and do not necessarily meet the needs of individuals.25 
In  the  Anglo-Saxon culture,  benefits  typically  include:  access  to  pension  funds,
reimbursement of health costs programs, the risk of death.
Less known, however, are the non-traditional benefits and known in practice as "perquisite",
such as personal loans at subsidized rates; the possibility of using the canteen and special
conventions of access to health funds, medical specialist; access to sports facilities, wellness,
kinder gardens and babysitting. To these are added some typical benefits reserved exclusively
for top management, certainly proportionate to the turnover of the company in question, such
as the personal chauffeur, helicopter or private jet and tax consultancy legal and financial. 
In  determining  the  articulation  of  the  benefits  package  delivered  to  executive  we  should
follow a series of steps starting from the identification of reward strategy that justifies the
inclusion of some of these rather than others. Usually a primary reason is the need to align the
remuneration  practices  in  vogue  in  the  reference  market,  so  as  to  deliver  a  competitive
remuneration compared to that promised by competitors. 
However, the emulation of best practices should always deal with the structure of the internal
costs, trying to choose, for example, those benefits that allow to achieve a tax saving. 
2.5 CEOs performance parameters
25
 In this case the goal of attraction and retention is not fully achieved. 
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In the 3rd chapter I will try to relate performance measures for banks, which allow us to go
back to the turnovers of the latter, with the compensation of the highest managerial positions
of the latter, to try to understand whether or not there is a correlation between performance
and pay.
Below I will explain and give brief definitions of the business metrics that I'm going to use in
the next chapter.
When determining the amount of variable remuneration, an important element is represented
by the choice of the parameters that are used to capture the performance according to which
the sums of varying amounts are paid. This is a crucial step in the construction process of the
compensation package, as is the appropriateness of those indicators in capturing the actual
efforts of the managers who will motivate the management towards achieving the corporate
goals.
The  ability  to  reward  the  company's  management  with  respect  to  the  achievement  of
predefined results is crucial especially in public companies, characterized by the presence of a
host of small shareholders with divergent interests, which is that of maximizing profit. The
form for  "public  company”  is  very widespread  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  world,  thanks  to  the
presence of an efficient capital market. It comes from the pulverization of ownership between
a very large number of shareholders,  none of  which holds  a  significant  equity shares for
control purposes.
Contrary to what happens in the Anglo-Saxon model, in the European model shareholders
actively participate in the daily management of the enterprise alongside the managers. In fact,
the control of enterprises is concentrated in the hands of a few shareholders. In societies that
have a share capital owned by a few large shareholders, shareholder can better monitor the
work of managers. 
It seems reasonable that the compensation package of executives depend on the company's
market value26. However, even when we consider the maximization of share price as a basic
parameter for determining the variable remuneration, we can reflect on the fact that the CEO
and other  executive actually are  not completely able  to influence this  dynamics27 (Koller,
Goedhart and Wessels, 2010).
Now, I will briefly explain the meaning of the indicators that I'm going to use in the third
chapter: ROE, EPS and Net Income.
26
 Stock based value
27
 Quotes often suffer from mood swings caused by market agents, sometimes not justified rationally.
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 ROE28 (Return on Equity) focuses on risk capital (equity) and expresses how much is
the  return  generated  by  each  of  reinvested  currency units  or  directly  invested  by
shareholders. ROE measures also the ability to remunerate the venture capital that the
shareholders, or the owner, took; in other words, is the amount of net income returned
as a percentage of shareholders’ equity. 
Return on equity measures a corporation's profitability by revealing how much profit
the investment of shareholder has created to the firm. 
 Net Income  is represented by the firm’s total earning. It is the total revenue in an
accounting period minus all expenses during the same period.  
 Earnings per share (EPS) are the profits that a company has generated parameterized
to the number of shares issued by the company itself. In other words, are the portion of
a firm’s profit allocated to each outstanding share of common stock. It is calculated as
the  ratio  of  the  difference  between  Net  Income and  dividends  on  preferred  stock
divided by the average outstanding shares.
So,  in  conclusion,  the  performance  management  system  is  nothing  but  the  complex
mechanisms and methodologies that lead to the identification of the measures of performance
criteria, which are a crucial choice for the effectiveness of the pay system as compared to
conduct management that are intended to achieve. Market indicators may suffer from market
euphoria or depression and uncontrollable by managers; the accounting indicators are affected
by arbitrary national accounting practices.
28
 It’s an economic index calculated by dividing the net profit for equity: ROE = Net Profit / Net equity * 100.
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CHAPTER 3
Empirical analysis
In this chapter I will analyze the performance of three banks and the compensation of their
managers during the crisis of sub-prime for the period between 2008 and 2011. Since the
crisis broke out in America, but it spread globally, I decided to analyze not only an American
bank (Goldman Sachs) but also two of the most important European banks: Deutsche Bank
(Germany), and HSBC (UK). 
The purpose of this analysis is to try to figure out if there is a correlation between executive
remuneration and bank’s performance during the crisis.
 
The chapter is structured as follows: with the first section we will explain how the model is
structured,  or  how it  will  be carried  out  the  analysis,  the  next  3  paragraphs present  data
analysis  and the results  for  each  individual  bank;  the  last  paragraph seeks  to  draw some
conclusions.
3.1 The structure of the model
The model is constructed as follows:
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 We will  analyze 3 banks, one at  the time; on the one hand we will  determine the
compensation of top managers, while the other will analyze the performance of the
bank;
 The analysis is constructed over a period of 4 years (2008-2011); 
 We will try to determine how the total remuneration of top managers are structured
(for  each  individual  bank).  Once  we  have  determined  this  point,  to  have  a  more
precise analysis, we will divide the analysis for components of remuneration and we
will  calculate  the  total  average  for  each  type  of  compensation.  The  remuneration
arrangements vary from bank to bank;
 To determine the performance of the bank I use three indicators: EPS, ROE and Net
Income29;
 The first  step will  be,  through the statistical  program R,  to  determine  the  various
coefficients of correlation. So, I will examine the linear relationship between variables
(the performance indicators and the various types of compensation) by the coefficient
of Pearson. In fact,  this  coefficient  is  used to determine the strength of the linear
relationship between two variables. The coefficient of linear correlation can range in
value from -1 and +1. The larger the absolute value of the coefficient, the stronger the
relationship  between  the  variables.  A  correlation  close  to  0  indicates  no  linear
relationship between the variables while an absolute value of 1 indicates a perfect
linear relationship. 
 To determine whether the correlation between variables is statistically significant, we
compare the p-value to our significance level. I will use a significance level of 0.05.
An α of 0.05 indicates that the risk of concluding that a correlation exists (or does not
exist), even if it does not exist (or exists), is 5%. If P-value ≤ α, then the correlation is
statistically  significant.  While  if  P-value  >  α,  the  correlation  is  not  statistically
significant.
 Finally,  after  having  computed  the  correlation  coefficient,  we  can  calculate  the
regression line with the slope, the intercept and the R-squared statistic (which provides
a measure of how well the model is fitting the actual date). It always lies between 0
and 1. If the R-squared is really close to 1, then the model is robust.
29
 The significance of EPS, ROE and Net Income were already explained in chapter 2.
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With this  type of analysis, I will  not be able to determine a cause and effect relationship
between the variables,  therefore I  will  not speak of dependent  and independent variables.
However, I will try to understand, despite the paltry number of observations, if there is some
sort of relationship between managers' remuneration and the performance of banks. We will
not be able to determine the direction of causality. So, the type of methodology that I’m going
to  use  does  not  allow  to  determine  whether  CEO’s  remuneration  influences  the  bank’s
performance indicators, or vice versa. I am aware of the limitations of this analysis. However,
it may help us to determine whether there is a sort of relationship between the variables. Then,
through the data, we could understand whether high compensations are somehow justified by
a good performance. 
3.2 Deutsche Bank: description and data.
In  Germany,  the  Supervisory  board  determines  and  reviews  the  policies  and  plans  of
compensation. In particular, a deep restructuring of the elements of the pay structure has been
implemented since 2009.
Deutsche Bank (DB) announced in its Compensation Report that the total remuneration of the
Management Board shall be distributed as follows:
 Non-related  remuneration components  with  the  performance,  i.e.  the  base  salary paid
monthly and other benefits;  Other benefits comprise reimbursement of taxable expenses
and the monetary value of non-cash benefits such as company cars and driver services,
insurance premiums, expenses for company-related social functions and security measures
(Deutsche bank management report 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011);
 Related  remuneration component  with  performance,  characterized  only  by  long-term
incentives  deferred  or  not.  For  2009,  forms  of  compensation  based  on  performance
consisted in payment of a bonus as "restricted incentive awards", which are "target bonus"
paid based on the achievement of the ROE planned; a medium-term incentive ( "MTI",
bestowed on the basis of the achievement of a target ratio between their total shareholder
return and the average TSR30 of a group of competing banks31 calculated for a period of
30
 Total shareholder return is the total return of a stock to an investor, or the capital gain plus dividends. 
31
 Six banks considered in the comparison: Banco Santander, BNP Paribas, Barclays and Credit Suisse, Goldman 
Sachs and JP Morgan Chase
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two years); The MTI were gradually replaced (starting from 2010) with the "Long-Term
Performance Award" ( "LTPA"), i.e. long-term incentive payments subject to deferral and
structured according to precise targets (Deutsche bank management report 2008, 2009,
2010, 2011).
In particular, if the Total Shareholder Return of the Deutsche Bank is less than the average
of the group of competitors, payment of LTPA is reduced, which is then deleted if the TSR
is maintained below the predetermined minimum. These incentives are deferred for at
least 50% in equity form, the remainder is monetary. 
Deferred shares in 2009 were distributed according to price’ assets at the time of their
delivery. From 2010 at the expiration of the vesting period it was added an additional
"holding period", after which managers can have full use of the shares received (Deutsche
bank management report 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011).
In the case of Deutsche Bank, the total compensation of top executives is determined by the
sum of basic salary, benefits, long term incentives and restricted equity, as explained in Table
3.2.
    Table 3.2: CEOs’ remuneration composition   
Notes: Information obtained from the Deutsche Bank Annual reports from 2008 to 2011. These data are in €.
This table represents the various components of the pay of  the 8 top managers of  the bank. Top managers
considered  are:  Josef  Ackermann  (Chief  Executive  Officer),  Anshuman  Jain  (Co-CEO),  Hugo  Banziger,
Herman-Josef  Lamberti  Stefan Krause, Michael  Cohrs,  Juergen Fitschen (joined the Management Board in
2009) and Rainer Neske (joined the Management Board in 2009). 
The basic salary is the sum of the basic salary of the 8 top managers for the four years. The same is true for the
benefits, the long-term incentive and restricted equity.
Table 3.2 shows the different components of the executives’ remuneration system in Deutsche
Bank. We can see that the pay is composed by a fixed and a variable part. What emerges is
that there is an increase through the four years of the basic salary. No long-term incentive and
restricted equity were granted during 2008, but since 2009 there has always been a decline in
these fees.
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In essence, from 2009 to 2011, there has been a decline in the total remuneration amount for
top managers.
To determine which managers, among the eight, has been paid more during the four years, the
most effective way is through a chart. In fact, from figure 3.1 we can see that the highest paid
CEO  in  the  space  of  four  years  were  Josef  Ackermann  (Chief  Executive  Officer)  and
Anshuman Jain (Co-CEO). Ackermann has increased its pay from 2008 to 2009 and then, in
the next  two years,  have seen it  fall,  in  any case not  substantially. Jain,  however, having
become Co-CEO in 2009, immediately saw a very high pay.
Also Juergen Fitschen and Rainer Neske have joined the Management Board in 2009. 
It should be emphasized that in 2010 and 2011 all seven executives received the same fixed
salary of € 1,150,000, while  Ackerman took € 1,650,000. In fact,  Hugo Banziger, Jurgen
Fitschen,  Stefan Krause,  Rainer  Neske and Michael  Cors  have  almost  a  similar  rewards’
trend.
        Figure 3.2: Executive Total Compensation at Deutsche Bank in 2008-2011. 
Note: the graph represents the total remuneration for each of the individual top managers, from 2008 to 2011.
Source: own elaboration of Deutsche Bank data.
3.2.1 Empirical Results
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After  this  background,  I  will  now  analyze  whether  and  how  the  different  types  of
remuneration of the CEO can in some way be related to bank performance. 
So, I tried to divide the total compensation in the various parts, and I computed the average
for the fixed salary, the benefits, the long-term incentives and equity restrict. In doing so, I
will analyze how the basic salary, the benefits, the long-term incentives and the restricted
equity behave in relation to the business indicators such as ROE, EPS and Net Income.
So, we calculate the average of each remuneration component and we relate it with the 3
performance indicators.
   Table 3.2.1: Average components of remuneration vs. performance indicators.
Note: average components of remuneration is derived by a calculation from a own elaboration data of the
Deutsche Bank Annual reports from 2008 to 2011. The average of the various compensation was calculated by
the  sum  of  each  item  for  the  8  top  managers  and  is  expressed  in  thousands  of  euro.  The  values  of  the
performance indicators have been obtained from Deutsche Bank Annual reports from 2008 to 2011. The EPS
(Earnings Per Share) and Net Income are expressed in euro, while ROE is expressed as a percentage. Net
Income is expressed in millions of Euro.
Table 3.2.2: Summary Statistics
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Note:  the  sample  consists  of  data  of  the  mean  of  the  different  compensation  components  and  the  bank’s
performance indicator. Data are for the 4th fiscal year of Deutsche Bank from 2008 to 2011. The results have
been calculated through the statistic program Gretl. 
So,  with the data  obtained in  Table 3.2.1,  we begin  our  correlation analysis  between the
variables using Pearson's coefficient. We relate, one at a time, the average of the different
components  of  remuneration  with  the  banks’ performance  indicators.  Let's  start  with  the
average of the basic salary, up to conclude with the average of the long-term incentives. As
can  be  immediately  seen  from  the  Table  3.2.3,  not  all  of  the  variables  listed  have  a
relationship  between  them.  In  fact,  calculating  the  linear  correlation  coefficient,  only the
Mean Benefits and Restricted Equity related with both EPS and Net Income are significant. In
addition, through the P-Value, we can confirm what was said, or the robustness of our results.
     Table 3.2.3: Linear coefficient and P-Value results
Note: these results were obtained through the use of the statistical program R.
Once we have determined the variables related to each other, we can finally calculate  the
regression line with the slope,  the intercept and the R-squared statistic (which provides a
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measure of how well the model is fitting the actual date).  The analysis will consider only
cases in which there is  a strong correlation between data.  The only statistically evaluable
reports are summarized in the following Table 3.2.4.
                 Table 3.2.4:  Regression of the statistically significant coefficients.
Column (I) refers to the relationship between the EPS and average of the benefits; Column
(II) takes into account the ratio between Net Income and the average of benefits; Column
(III), however, refers to the EPS and the average of the Restricted Equity; finally, Column
(IV) refers to the relation of the average of Restricted Equity with Net Income.
         Figure 3.2.1:  EPS and Mean benefits (linear regression is red dotted).
Note: Data were obtained from Deutsche Bank Annual reports from 2008 to 2011. The chart was created from
data processing and via the statistical program R.
The linear correlation coefficient between Mean Benefits and EPS is 0.9894. Among the data
analyzed, it is possible to envisage a strong linear correlation, as our result is very close to 1.
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To determine the robustness of our results, we calculate the p-value, and we find that it is
0.0106. This result is statistically significant,  as it is less than 0.05. Being the correlation
coefficient  statistically significant,  we can calculate  the regression line which has a slope
equal to 0.1817 and an intercept of -14.5773. The coefficient R-squared is 0.97. 
So, in our case R-squared is really close to 1, then the model is robust.
  Figure 3.2.2:  Net Income and mean benefits (linear regression is red dotted).
Note: Data were obtained from Deutsche Bank Annual reports from 2008 to 2011. The chart was created from
data processing and via the statistical program R.
The linear  correlation  coefficient  that  we get  between Mean Benefits  and Net  Income is
0.9934. It’s indicating that among the analyzed data is possible to envisage a strong linear
correlation. P-value is 0.0066, then, statistically the result is significant (the probability that it
is due to chance is less than 5%).
Being  the  correlation  coefficient  statistically  significant,  we  calculate  the  regression  line
which has a slope equal to 113.5703 and an intercept equal to -8294.5382. The coefficient R-
squared is  0.97. Again,  we can support that there is a strong correlation between average
benefits and the net income of the bank.
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Figure 3.2.3: EPS and mean Restricted Equity (linear regression is red dotted).
Note: Data were obtained from Deutsche Bank Annual reports from 2008 to 2011. The chart was created from
data processing and via the statistical program R.
We relate Mean Restricted Equity with EPS. The linear correlation coefficient between the
two variables is 0.9979. To determine whether the result that we have obtained is statistically
significant, we calculate the p-value that is 0.0021. 
Being the correlation coefficient statistically significant, we can calculate the regression line
that has an angular coefficient of 0.0064 and -7.4532 intercepts. The coefficient R-squared is
0.97,  so  we  can  say  that  the  observed  data  are  robust  to  support  that  there  is  a  strong
correlation between average restricted equity and EPS of the bank.
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Figure 3.2.4: Net Income and mean restricted equity (linear regression is red dotted).
Note: Data were obtained from Deutsche Bank Annual reports from 2008 to 2011. The chart was created from
data processing and via the statistical program R.
Finally, the linear correlation coefficient between Mean Restricted Equity and the Net Income
is: 0.9932 and is possible to envisage a strong linear correlation. We calculate the p-value that
is 0.0068. Statistically, then, the result is significant.
The regression line which has a slope of 3.9718 and intercept of -3791.8101. The coefficient
R-squared is 0.97. Again, being the R-square close to 1, we can say that the observed analysis
is robust enough to support that there is a strong correlation between the average number of
restricted equity and the Net Income of the bank.
In summary, the variable components compensation, of the 8 top managers of Deutsche Bank,
for the four years of the crisis (2008-2011), are related to the performance indicators. Indeed,
51
benefits and restricted equity are statistically related with EPS and Net Income. Instead the
fixed salary component  of  the  executives  does  not  have  any type  of  correlation with  the
performance indicators.  Furthermore, we do not find any kind of relationship, nor with the
variable part, nor with the fixed one, with ROE.
Nevertheless,  we  can  say  that,  when  the  performance  of  the  bank  are  positive,  also  top
managers are paid more.
3.3 Goldman Sachs: description and data.
The  Board  and  the  Compensation  & Management  Development  Committee  of  Goldman
Sachs have attempted over the years to build balanced compensation programs that absolve
the fundamental task to attract, motivate, retain top talent, focusing on plans that promote
long-term profitability in line with the long-term strategies.
The US banking group does know that its pay decisions are not based on the results achieved
in the short-term. It follows that a high proportion of the compensation package is composed
by equity instruments that vest after a number of years. These instruments are attributed to
senior management based on the achievement of specified ROI values, taking into account
some other measures "risk adjusted" and the creation of value in the long term. The bank
wants to optimize the link between management compensation and performance, searching to
avoid all forms of incentives that make a lean performance with excessive risk-taking.
The US bank draws up its compensations’ policy and plans looking to its main competitors
and other major industries. In addition, performance is measured also by establishing a set of
performance measures to assess the individual contribution in terms of management control,
risk management and innovation (Goldman Sachs’ annual report 2008-2011). 
Goldman Sachs adopts the Total Reward System which is divided into an appropriate mix of
fixed (the salary) and variable remuneration elements, the latter paid in cash and short and
long-term incentives  based  on  shares.  More  than  90% of  total  remuneration  for  the  top
managers in 2011 was variable, of which over 65% paid in equity instruments related to long-
term performance.
Since 2009 Goldman Sachs has tried to increase fixed salary and gradually reduce short-term
incentive component,  while  increasing the long-term variable  portion paid in  the form of
share capital (at least 75% for executives). 
In the case of Goldman Sachs, the total compensation of the top executives is determined by
the sum of the basic salary, bonuses, change in pension value, other compensation and stocks.
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Other compensation includes: life insurance and medical plan. All this is explained in Table
3.3.
Table 3.3: CEOs’ remuneration composition   
Notes: Information obtained from the Goldman Sachs Annual reports from 2008 to 2011. These data are in $.
This table represents the various components of the pay of  the 5 top managers of  the bank. Top managers
considered are: Lloyd C. Blankfein (Chief Executive Officer), Gary D Cohn ( COO+ President), David A. Viniar
(CFO), J. Micheal Evans ( Vice Chairman) and John S. Weinberg (Vice Chairman). 
The basic salary is the sum of the basic salary of the 5 top managers for the four years. The same is true for the
total bonus, the total change in pension value, the other compensation and the total stock.
Table 3.3 shows the fixed and variable payments to "NEOs" ("Named Executive Officers") of
Goldman Sachs. So, what emerges is a very clear evolution of pay progression. No incentive
plan awards and bonuses were granted to them during 2008 and 2009 (exactly in the heart of
the crisis years), while in 2010, bonuses were paid for 27 million dollars and in 2011 to 15
million dollars. In fact, in 2010 and 2011, the variable component was restored and greatly
increased  the  pay  package.  Over  the  same  period  the  stock  awards  came  respectively
$38,250,065 and $ 53,550,365, a huge increase over previous years. Finally, even the base
salary has grown exponentially over the course of the four years. 
From Figure 3.3 we can see that for the first two years, the five top managers’ compensations
differ between them, while in the past two years the remuneration are almost identical. In the
three years from 2008 to 2010 it was paid only the fixed salary of $ 600,000 to each of the top
five executive. NEOs salaries’ were increased beginning in 201132. It should be emphasized
32
 Before this adjustment, all of them had been receiving the same $600.000 salary since 1999, when Goldman 
Sachs became a public company.
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that in 2011 all four executives received the same fixed salary of $1.85 million, while Mr
Blankfein  took  $2  million  (the  compensation  committee  believes  that  these  salary  levels
provide the appropriate balance between fixed and variable compensation).
 Figure 3.3: Executive Total Compensation at Goldman Sachs in 2008-2011. 
Note: the graph represents the total remuneration for each of the individual top managers, from 2008 to
2011. Source: own elaboration of Goldman Sachs data.
3.3.1 Empirical Results
After  this  background,  I  will  now  analyze  whether  and  how  the  different  types  of
remuneration of the CEO can in some way be related to bank performance. 
So, I tried to divide the total compensation in the various parts, and I computed the average
for the fixed salary, the bonuses, the change in pension value, other compensation and stocks.
In doing so, I will  analyze how the basic salary, bonuses, change in pension value,  other
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compensation and stocks behave in relation to the business indicators such as ROE, EPS and
Net Income.
      Table 3.3.1: Average components of remuneration vs. performance indicators.
Note: average components of remuneration is derived by a calculation from a own elaboration data of the
Goldman Sachs Annual reports from 2008 to 2011. The average of the various compensation was calculated by
the sum of  each item for  the  5 top managers  and is  expressed in  thousands of  dollars.  The values  of  the
performance indicators have been obtained from Goldman Sachs Annual reports from 2008 to 2011. The EPS
(Earnings Per Share) and Net Income are expressed in dollars, while ROE is expressed as a percentage. Net
Income is expressed in millions of dollars.
Table 3.3.2: Summary Statistics
Note:  the sample consists  of  data of  the average of  the different  compensation components and the bank’s
performance indicator. Data are for the 4th fiscal year of Goldman Sachs from 2008 to 2011. The results have
been calculated through the statistic program Gretl. 
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With the data obtained in  Table 3.3.1,  we can make our correlation analysis  between the
variables using Pearson's coefficient. We relate, one at a time, the average of the variable
components of remuneration with the banks’ performance indicators. I will begin with the
average of the basic salary, up to conclude with the average of stocks.
From this first analysis we can see that it seems there is no kind of relationship between our
variables. To be absolutely certain and to determine the robustness of our results, we calculate
the p-value, to determine if the correlation coefficients are statistically significant.
Table 3.3.3: Linear coefficient and P-Value results
After having analyzed our variables also with the p-value, we can definitely say that there is
no kind of possible correlation between executives’ compensations and bank’s performance
indicators in Goldman Sachs. In fact, none of the results obtained approaches to 0.05. 
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Not only we do not find a correlation between the fixed part of the remuneration and the
bank's  performance,  but  also with  the  variable  one.  Any type  of  remuneration  presents  a
correlation with ROE, EPS and Net Income. Then, we can conclude that despite the fact that
the  bank's  performance  does  not  improve,  the  pay of  CEOs,  fixed  and  variable,  greatly
increases and therefore, even if there is a decline in profits from the bank, we still find an
increase in fees for managers.
I want to emphasize the fact that, despite the decline of the ROE and EPS and the decrease of
the Net Income through the four years, Goldman Sachs was one of the best performing banks
in the US during the crisis’ years.
From Goldman Sachs report we can clearly understand that the bank performance has always
been superior compared to its competitors. In fact, we can find that the average ROE of Bank
of America, Morgan Stanley,  JP Morgan and Citigroup, during the first three years of the
crisis, was incredibly lower compare to that of GS.
Figure 3.3.1:  Goldman Sachs’s ROE vs  US Peer  Average (JPM, Citigroup,  Bank of
America and Morgan Stanley)’ ROE from 2006 to 2010. 
The  figure shows  the  trend  of  the  annual  ROE performance,  over  a  period  of  five  years  (2006-2010) for
Goldman Sachs compared to the average of other 4 Americans’ bank. The blue column represents the Goldman
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Sachs’ ROE performance, while the light blue column represents the US peer averages’ ROE performance. We
can  note  that  Goldman  Sachs’ performance  was  excellent  compared  to  the  other.  For  2006  we  have  a
performance difference of 15.3% and for 2007 even more, 24.3%. In the middle years of the crisis, we see a
decline also for our bank, but still lower than that of others. Finally, in 2010 we can perceive a recovery for the
US peer banks, but still there is a gap of 5.6% with GS. Source: The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. April 2011.
Also from the stock price performance, we can understand that Goldman Sachs has had a 
better performance than the other US banks.
Figure  3.3.2:  Goldman Sachs’s  stock  price  performance  vs  US Peer  Average  (JPM,
Citigroup, Bank of America and Morgan Stanley)’stock prices  from 2008 to 2010. 
The figure shows the trend of the stock price performance (2008-2010) of Goldman Sachs compared to
that of the US peer average. We can immediately understand that GS is the best (+25%), followed by
Morgan Stanley (+11%). Bank of America, JPM and Citigroup have more than negative results. Source:
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. April 2011.
Someone could argue that Goldman Sachs CEO deserves that high pay because of the good
firm performance compared to those of the other American banks. However, the critical point
is to understand why the managers' salaries were so high despite the poor bank performance
during the years of the crisis. 
For the first two years (2008-2009), as we have already noted, executives only received the
fixed salary with no stock and benefits. This was justified by the bank as the right way to get
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through the  financial  turmoil.  For  the  next  two years,  however, the  top  NEOs33 received
vertiginous compensation precisely because of the stocks. 
Even if Goldman Sachs was the best American bank in performance during the years’ crisis, it
is still difficult to understand why executives’ compensation were so high, even if there’s no
correlation between the bank performance and their remuneration.
3.4 HSBC: description and data.
HSBC, the first British banking group and second in the world by total volume in 2011, has
set itself the objective of structuring a highly competitive compensation package consisting of
three basic parts (fixed salary, bonuses and long-term incentives), of which a large portion is
deferred and paid according to performance. In fact, the basic starting point for the allocation
of bonus is in measuring the contribution to individual performance and group assessed by
monitoring  the  level  of  achievement  of  a  series  of  financial  and non-financial  objectives
relating to financial results, processes, learning and innovation (HSBC, Annual Reports and
Accounts 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011).
The purpose of the fixed pay is to attract and retain employees by paying market competitive
pay for the role, skills and experience required for the business. These payments are fixed and
do not vary with performance.  The Group provides benefits in accordance with local market
practice. This includes, but is not limited to the provision of pensions, medical insurance, life
insurance, health assessment, and relocation allowances. 
Bonuses can be up to four times the basic wage and are either deferred or immediately paid. 
In 2011 it was launched a long-term incentive plan for top executives based on performance
shares (GPSP, "Group Performance Share Plan") with a five-year vesting period, that once
assigned must be compulsorily kept in portfolio until retirement age. Incentives deferred in
the  long  run  can  be  up  to  seven times  the  value  of  wages.  The  performance  shares  are
recognized based on the achievement  of prescribed values of  the earning per  share,  total
shareholder return and economic profit (HSBC, Annual Reports and Accounts 2008, 2009,
2010 and 2011).
In the case of HSBC, the total compensation of the top executives is determined by the sum of
the basic salary, bonus, allowances and benefits.  All this is explained in Table 3.4. 
33
 Named Executives Officers.
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Table 3.4: CEOs’ remuneration composition   
Notes: Information obtained from the HSBC Annual reports from 2008 to 2011. These data are in thousands of £.
This table represents the various components of the pay of  the 4 top managers of  the bank. Top managers
considered  are:  S.  T.Gulliver(CEO),  A.A.Flockhart  (President  and  Group  Managing  Director  and  Chief
Executive Officer of The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation ),  D.Flint (Group Finance Director
Chairman of HSBC Finance Corporation) and V.H.Cheng (Executive Director and Chairman of The Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation)
The basic salary is the sum of the basic salary of the 4 top managers for the four years. The same is true for the
total bonus, allowances and benefits.
Table 3.4 shows the different types of the total compensation for the HSBC’s top managers.
We can note that the fixed part of the remuneration, namely the basic salary, has seen an
increase from year to year. For the variable part, however, we can see the there are contrasting
movements. In fact, allowances have had an increasing trend through the four years; instead
bonuses and benefits have had a fluctuating trend over the same period of time.
Figures 3.4 shows us that among the four top managers, the luckiest was the Group Chief
Executive, Thomson Stuart Gulliver, who, in 2009, has seen boosted his salary to £9,826,000.
Subsequently,  after  2009,  also  for  him there  was  a  reduction,  while  still  maintaining  the
highest salary among the top executives. A.A. Flockhart and VHC Cheng in the first two
years have had a wage almost identical, but while Flockhart has maintained a trends constant
over the years, though still crescent, but at the same time stable, Cheng has seen his salary fall
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year after year. Finally, D J Flint,  has increased for the first three years his salary, before
declining in 2011. The conclusion that can be drawn is that all executives have seen their pay
increase from 2008 to 2009, however, there has been a downward trend decline from 2010 to
2011, except for Flockhart. So we can guess that in the following years to the advent of the
crisis the wages of the CEO have suffered reductions.
Figure 3.4: Executive Total Compensation at HSBC in 2008-2011. 
Note: the graph represents the total remuneration for each of the individual top managers, from 2008 to 2011. 
Source: own elaboration of HSBC data.
3.4.1 Empirical Results
Now, I  will  try  to  analyze  how  the  different  types  of  remuneration  are  related  to  bank
performance. So, again, I divide the total compensation in the various parts, and I compute the
average for fixed salary, bonuses, allowances and benefits. In doing so, I will analyze how the
basic salary, the bonus, the allowances and the benefits behave in relation to the business
indicators such as ROE, EPS and Net Income.
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Table 3.4.1: Average components of remuneration vs. performance indicators.
Note: average components of remuneration is derived by a calculation from a own elaboration data of the HSBC
Annual reports from 2008 to 2011. The average of the various compensation was calculated by the sum of each
item for the 4 top managers and is expressed in thousands of pounds. The values of the performance indicators
have been obtained from HSBC Annual reports from 2008 to 2011. The EPS (Earnings Per Share) are expressed
in US dollars while Net Income are expressed in millions of pounds. ROE is expressed as a percentage.
Table 3.4.2: Summary Statistics
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Note:  the sample consists  of  data of  the average of  the different  compensation components and the bank’s
performance indicator. Data are for the 4th fiscal  year of  HSBC from 2008 to 2011.  The results have been
calculated through the statistic program Gretl. 
With the data obtained in  Table 3.4.1,  we can make our correlation analysis  between the
variables using Pearson's coefficient. We relate, one at a time, the average of the variable
components of remuneration with the banks’ performance indicators. I will begin with the
average of the basic salary, up to conclude with the average of benefits.
As  can  be  immediately seen  from the  Table  3.4.3,  not  all  of  the  variables  listed  have  a
relationship between them. In fact, calculating the linear correlation coefficient, only Mean
Bonus related with EPS is significant. In addition, through the P-Value, we can confirm the
robustness  of  our  results.  Through our  analysis  we can  state  that there is  no relationship
between  the  other variables. 
Table  3.4.3:
Linear  coefficient and  P-Value
results
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Once we have determined that Mean bonus and EPS are related to each other, we can finally
calculate  the  regression  line  with  the  slope,  the  intercept  and  the  R-squared  statistic,
summarized in the Table 3.4.4.
Table 3.4.4:  Regression of the statistically significant coefficients.
Column (I) refers to the relationship between the EPS and average of the bonus and indicates
the regression line.
Figure 3.4.1: EPS and Mean bonus (linear regression is red dotted).
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Note: Data were obtained from HSBC Annual reports from 2008 to 2011. The chart was created from data
processing and via the statistical program R.
The linear correlation coefficient between Mean Bonus and EPS is 0.9863. Among the data
analyzed, it is possible to envisage a strong linear correlation, as our result is very close to 1.
To prove with greater certainty whether there is a relationship, we calculate the p-value, and
we find that it is 0.0137. 
Being the correlation coefficient statistically significant, we can calculate the regression line
which has a slope equal to 0.0068 and an intercept of -1.9261. The coefficient R-squared is
0.97. So, in our case R-squared is really close to 1.
All the other variables considered in our model are not statistically significant.
So, even for HSBC, we can say that we haven’t find a great relationship between performance
and pay, with the only exception of mean bonuses related to EPS. In this way we can assume
that although there is a negative performance of the bank, top managers’ compensation are not
affected.
3.5 Findings
I tried to take as a reference of the analysis three of the most important banks in the Western
world. The outlook for the banking industry has been profoundly influenced by the financial
crisis. During this time, financial markets underwent a period of extraordinarily turbulent and
difficult  conditions.  Capital  markets  faced  conditions  of  severe  stress  and  exceptional
volatility. These developments also put pressure on bank balance sheets and their liquidity
(Financial Report of Deutsche Bank). 
Despite this situation of financial hardship, the compensation of bank managers does not seem
to have suffered that much.
All three banks have seen, over the period of four years, lowered or maintained stable their
fixed pay. Actually the fixed component does not seem to be very important in determining a
possible link between pay and performance.  Instead,  the most profitable components,  and
which have increased dramatically over the years, have been the variable remuneration part,
i.e. stocks and bonuses. For Deutsche Bank CEOs, that for the first year (2008) have seen
only fixed salary and benefit,  and Goldman Sachs executives, that for the first  two years
(2008-2009) have received neither bonuses nor stock, adding the latter has had more than a
positive impact on their final rewards. In fact, we have seen increases of thousands of euro
and dollars their salaries.
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Unlike the first two banks, HSBC has always paid its executives, in all four years of the crisis,
with both fixed and variable remuneration, focusing mainly on bonuses. In 2011, however, it
has  managed  to  reduce  the  flow  of  the  bonuses  until  getting  a  match  among  their
remuneration and corporate profit.
From Figure 3.5 we can immediately understand that the most profitable bank among the
three in the last four years has been HSBC, while the NEOs of Goldman Sachs are the highest
paid managers compared to the other two banks. This makes us think that despite Goldman
Sachs in those four years has seen its profits decline, has still paid more its managers.
Instead, HSBC, unlike the other two analyzed banks, maintains a fairly constant trend of the
Income and also in rewards. Deutsche Bank seems to be the only of the three banks, to show a
related trend, during the four years, between wages and performance.
Figure 3.5: Total compensation vs Net income of Deutsche Bank, HSBC and Goldman 
Sachs from 2008 to 2011. 
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Note: Income and total compensation for Deutsche Bank are expressed in Euro, total compensation and Income
for Goldman Sachs are expressed in dollars while Income and total compensation for HSBC are expressed in
pound. Source: own elaboration of HSBC, Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank data.
In summary: we do not find any kind of correlation between compensation and performance
for Goldman Sachs. For HSBC, however, we find a positive relationship between EPS and the
average bonus. Instead, for Deutsche Bank we find a positive relationship between EPS and
the average of the benefits and restricted equity; and between Net Income and the average of
benefits and restricted equity.
Then we can assume that the German bank has a remuneration policy more consistent than the
two Anglo-Saxon banks; or it has managed to find an effective strategy to align remuneration
with performance the Company's performance.
A good incentive pay system needs to target the optimal trade-off between performance and
pay (Efing  et  all.,  2014).  For  Goldman  and HSBC,  it  seems that  their  political  strategic
choices does not reach this optimal trade-off.
So in conclusion, we can say that the high managers' rewards, do not go hand in hand with the
income ratio of the bank and, therefore, can not be justified. In fact, from our analysis we can
say that pay are not link to performance.
My intention is not at all to do moralism, but simply to raise an important issue and draw
some simple reflection. It is correct that, despite numerous layoffs, bankruptcy, those who
could  prevent  or  soothe  the  greatest  financial  catastrophe  since  1929,  receive  stellar
compensations? It is also true that Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank and HSBC have managed
to come out victorious from the crisis and have once again become the most competitive
banks in the financial world. Then, surely some of the credit of the success is also recognized
to their  executives and managers who have managed to navigate the stormy sea bringing
almost everyone out on dry land. But despite everything, are really all these stock and bonuses
necessary to encourage the top of the pyramid to "will the good for the bank"?
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CONCLUSIONS
Managers' compensations are one of the topics that, since the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy,
still feed the economic and financial debate in media, at conferences and in international fora.
The  rapid  deterioration  of  the  global  macroeconomic  conditions,  especially  in  the  most
advanced countries, has led many academics and other scholars to launch a real "hunt down”
for those responsible of the crisis. Knowing whom and what to blame is essential to reduce
the chances that such a thing happen again and for correcting the dysfunctional aspects of
today's financial markets. We must beware of too easy explanations, which often call into
question the excessive greed of bankers. Part of it is certainly true, but this hypothesis doesn’t
provide any element of reform. Banks have behaved so greedy because they were encouraged
to do so and no one prevented them to act in that way. So, this is an aspect that we have to
change. Moreover, the very essence of capitalism is the pursuit of profit: So must we blame
banks for doing what everyone does in a market economy? (Stiglitz, 2010)
Financial institutions have complained that regulators have not prevented them from behaving
badly. However, while on one hand the most serious crimes fall on the financial sector, on the
other regulators have not done what they should have, that is, make sure that the banks do not
behave badly (Stiglitz, 2010). But banks had grown so much that they became not only too
big  to  fail,  but  also  too  powerful  politically  in  order  to  be  subject  to  restrictions  (little
consideration, if they were too big to fail, should they not be too big to exist?).
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Bankers  are  not  born  more  greedy  than  other  types  of  workers.  They  only  have  more
opportunities  and  incentives  to  behave  badly  at  the  expense  of  others.  When  private
remuneration is properly aligned to the social objectives, everything works; when this does
not happen, things can go wrong. 
Normally in market economies, the incentives tend to be properly aligned. In the financial
markets, however, the incentives are distorted.
An important example of distortion of incentives is the number of executives who are paid in
stock options. In the financial sector, a large part of the remuneration is paid in form of bonus
attached to income. According to many, these remuneration systems would build an incentive
for executives to work harder. This argument is false because the leaders find a way to get
paid well even when the company is in trouble. In fact, we have seen the explicit example of
this problem right in Goldman Sachs: the bank was facing a very critical period, and despite
that  the  top  managers  were  receiving  exorbitant  fees.  Indeed,  from  our  analysis,  albeit
considering a too limited number of variables, we find a little relationship between pay and
banks’ results, as seen when managers of companies with record losses have earned bonuses
by billions of dollars.
If workers are paid by a piece rate system, they will try to produce as much as possible at the
expense  of  quality.  After  all,  they  are  paid  for  the  amount  not  for  the  quality.  This
phenomenon occurred  throughout  the  financial  chain,  especially in  this  crisis,  where  real
estate brokers have sold more mortgages that they could, without worrying about whether
they would be paid in a future. Investment banks have created the largest possible number of
complex products starting from the toxic mortgages because, very simply, they were paid to
do that (Stiglitz, 2010).
Executives  paid  in  stock  options  had  every  interest  to  push  up  the  share  price  of  their
company. They knew that the higher were the reported earnings, the greater would be the
share price. This obsession of short-term profits has led banks to focus their attention on how
to generate more revenue and how to circumvent the accounting and financial rules.
One  of  the  easiest  ways  to  increase  reported  earnings  was  to  manipulate  the  financial
statements, disappearing losses with one hand by recording profits with the other. Investors
and  regulators  were  alerted,  but  evidently they had  not  learned  the  lesson:  the  “creative
accounting” was behind many of the scandals related to the technology bubble “dot com” of
the late  nineties.  Moreover, the innovation that  Wall  Street  was so proud of,  consisted in
inventing new products that generate significant revenue for companies in the short term. The
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problems  that  would  be  present  due  to  the  high  default  rates  related  to  some  of  these
innovations seemed an unreal problem (Stiglitz, 2010). 
The concept that I want to emphasize is that in the powerful pattern of financial incentives,
bankers participate in the division of profits but not losses. Bankers receive bonuses at year-
end, based supposedly on results they have reached during the year; these bonuses are much
larger than a banker’s yearly salary34 ( Hill and Painter, 2010).
However, bonuses, in financial markets, may encourage risk-taking since such risk-taking is
used to create high returns (Bell and Van Reenen, 2010).  By taking excessive risks, I refer to
those actions that may either increase or decrease the banks’ asset value but whose expected
effect on bank value is negative (Bebchuk and Spamann, 2009).
Since risk-taking is desirable in financial sector, it is a key reason to encourage performance-
related pay (Bell and Van Reenen, 2010). However, executives, that are paid in bonuses on the
basis of the annual profits of their book, have only an incentive to look for short-term profits
and to maximize risk-taking, at the expense of the long-term interests of the bank (Bell and
Van  Reenen,  2010).  In  fact,  bankers  typically  receive  stock  options  that  are  believed  to
shorten bankers’ time horizons. Shorter time horizons motivate risk-taking (Hill and Painter,
2010).
From this  assumption,  a  large  international  literature  began  to  investigate  the  correlation
between executive pay and incentives with taking greater financial risks. The international
work, carried out so far, show rather discordant empirical evidence, even on some phenomena
that seemed to be now undisputed. We saw in the variable remuneration in equity instruments
(such as stock options) a useful tool to solve the problem expressed by agency theory relative
to the misalignment between the interests of managers and shareholders. In many cases, in
fact, precisely such forms of benefit, ended up inducing executives to distorted behaviors. 
Inexplicably, executives like to ascribe to themselves the merits of the success, but show little
sense  of  responsibility  when  it  comes  to  failures.  When  there  were  stratospheric  profits,
bankers claimed the merit of the latter, saying that it was the result of their work; instead,
when there were huge losses, everything depended on forces outside of their control (Stiglitz,
2010).
These  attitudes  are  reflected  in  executives’ compensations,  that  despite  the  emphasis  on
incentives,  often did not show any link between pay and performance.  The remuneration
34
 Again, bonuses were not based on the results in the long run, but on those shortly.
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incentive is high when the results are good, but when they are poor, the difference shall be
offset with an incentive to ensure that the executive does not leave the company. 
The experts argue that is necessary give high compensation to the manager, despite the poor
results, because otherwise they could leave the bank for another one. We might have expected
that banks wanted to get rid of managers who perform poorly. However, experts reiterate that
profits  are  low not  because  managers'  performance  is  inadequate,  but  because  of  events
beyond their control.
The  point  is  that  when  profits  were  high,  experts  should  have  used  the  same reasoning
(Stiglitz, 2010).
The truth is that, rewarding top managers with different forms of stock compensation may not
tie the executive’s efforts to company performance closely enough. Stock price may rise or
fall regardless of the strategic moves of the company’s executives, but simply they change
because of market forces. Manager can become wealthy by being in the right place at the right
time  and not  by the  merits  of  his  performance.  And then,  this  could  offer  instead  of  an
incentive, a disincentive to work hard if the stock price moves regardless of effort (Sigler,
2011).
After the financial crisis of 2008, the international debate has called into question the whole
organization  of  internal  corporate  governance.  Also,  the  fact  that  the  crisis  has  involved
financial  banks  and  that  banks  rely  heavily  on  bonuses,  have  led  many  economics  and
politician to consider the fact that bank bonuses could have been one of the causes of the
crisis and they could have been the fuel that ignited the fragile economic world (Murphy,
2012). So, managers have got away thanks to an inadequate corporate governance system. 
That executives had every incentive to devise a remuneration system that would go to their
advantage it seems clear now. The mystery that remains to understand is why shareholders did
not  have  noticed  these  behaviors.  Perhaps  the  imperfections  in  the  corporate  governance
system were  not  allowed  to  directly  change  the  behavior  of  the  management.  However,
investors  should  have  punished  companies  characterized  by  a  structure  with  perverse
incentives by bringing down the share price (Stiglitz, 2010).
Reducing the scope of conflicts of interest, limiting the short-sighted behavior and excessive
risk are one of the key aspects of the reforms that should be introduced. If bankers have the
wrong incentives, they will endeavor to avoid any other rule. A simple reform like that to base
the  remuneration  on  long-term  results,  making  sure  that  bankers  must  also  assume
responsibility for losses, in addition to dividing the gains, could make a big difference. If
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companies resort to incentives-based remuneration, that is, but then they should be required to
demonstrate that there is a relationship between pay and long-term results.
To effectively deal  with  the problems of  incorrect  and distorted incentives,  it  seems also
necessary some corporate governance reforms, to ensure that managers are aware of their
responsibility toward shareholders (Stiglitz, 2010).
The conclusions, resulting from the empirical evidence in the 3rd chapter, allow us to say that,
between 2008 and 2011, no strong empirical evidence existed at the international level in
relation to the phenomena. In particular, there is no evidence, in our sample, of an association
between fixed compensation and bank performance. Therefore, although the mutated set of
global  rules  has  pushed  in  the  direction  of  greater  correlation  "pay-performance",  it  is
believed that we have to wait a few years before being able to see a real connection between
these.
In addition, we must reflect on the fact that the non-existence of such empirical evidence is
primarily  attributable  to  the  fact  that  the  most  powerful  managers  can  still  influence  the
amount of their compensation packages. Therefore, it is hoped that in the future the burden of
leadership in the self-determination of their pay packages will be attenuated.
From the  analysis  conducted  on  the  executives’ remuneration  structures,  we  see  a  trend
towards  the  removal  of  these  reward  tools  and  mechanisms  merely  geared  to  the
maximization of short-term results ("shorterminism"). It is becoming more virtuous practices
to improve the pay performance correlation (such as benefits and deferred bonus).
To sum up, compensation incentives should be based on performance and should be aligned
with shareholder interests and long term firm profitability; not induce risk-taking in excess of
the  firms’  risk  appetite;  have  a  component  reflecting  the  firm’s  overall  results  and
achievement other goals (Grant, 2009).
This thesis was born with the intention to analyze if there is any evidence that executive
remuneration packages in the financial sector might have contributed to the sub-prime crisis. 
It is evident that the precise causes of the global financial crisis will be debated for decades.
However, the evolving consensus suggests that the crisis was mainly linked to the collapse of
the US housing prices and the contribution of risk-taking (Murphy, 2013). Reducing risk-
taking is simple. Just put some brakes and making sure that banks have an incentive to do the
opposite. Do not allow banks to use incentives that encourage excessive risk assumption and
force them to greater transparency would be a good step forward.
Too many people have been led to believe that certain wages reflect a social contribution,
coming to the conclusion that those who received such high salaries certainly made a very
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important service to society. The high compensation of bank managers were the mirror of the
importance of banks.
The way the market has altered our way of thinking is illustrated by the attitude towards
incentive pays. A society in which CEO are allowed to give their best performance only if
they receive some economic incentives, definitely is not a healthy society.
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